In the Tevijja Sutta (DN 13 ), the Buddha addresses Brahmin students who are described as being learned in the Vedas and belonging to specific Brahmanical lineages. The sutta explicitly situates its interlocutors within the orthodox Vedic tradition, often identified within the Yajurvedic and Sāmavedic recensions:- > Even though brahmins describe different paths—the Adhvaryu brahmins, > the **Taittirīya brahmins, the Chāndogya brahmins**, the Cāndrāyaṇa > brahmins, and the Bahvṛca brahmins—all of them still lead someone who > practices them to the company of Divinity These Brahmins understood as followers of what I suppose were the Taittirīya and Chāndogya Upaniṣadic traditions of the time claim knowledge of the path to union or “company with Brahmā” (brahmasahavyatā). The Buddha responds by redefining the path to Brahmā not through birth, sacrifice, or Vedic recitation, but through the cultivation of the four brahmavihāras. > “So it seems that that mendicant is not encumbered with possessions, > and neither is the Divinity. Would a mendicant who is not encumbered > with possessions join together and converge with the Divinity, who > isn’t encumbered with possessions?” > > “Yes, worthy Gotama.” > > “Good, Vāseṭṭha! **It’s quite possible that a mendicant who is not > encumbered with possessions will, when the body breaks up, after > death, be reborn in the company of Divinity, who isn’t encumbered with > possessions.** Is the Buddha’s teaching of “Brahmasahavyatā” in the Tevijja Sutta intended as a normative soteriological teaching for Buddhists, or is it better understood as a skillful means (upāya) directed specifically at non-Buddhist Brahmins or Followers of Upanishadic traditions, reframing their own theological goal in ethical and meditative terms without endorsing it as final liberation (nibbāna)?

Why are the three marks (consolidated) not directly included in the Satipatthana Sutta - supposedly the most important of all discourses? Not in the section of principles, but indirectly with regards to the body: > *They meditate observing the body as liable to originate, as liable to vanish, and as liable to both originate and vanish.* Perhaps it is due to the later historical ontological organization of those three messages? Any tangential ideas are welcome.

Hello Beautiful People, I have a quick question. After years of meditating with a mixture of Mahasi and Goenka style, I would like to ask the following. Very often when I sit to mediate, it is a matter of seconds to experience a subtle sense of pleasure and/or spaciousness. But more interestingly, is that after meditating a bit more there comes a feeling that my eyes want to move upwards, almost like if they want to see behind my head/brain. The first times this eye movement happened, years ago, there was fear in me because this was unusual and unexpected - it was even a bit painful. But after letting this movement happen I realized that the traditional lights, pleasure, and spaciousness became more present. Sometimes this leads to a very focalized pleasure spot at the top of my head and sometimes to the feeling that from that spot a very strong and interesting sense of pleasure would come from it (like if there is a cascade of pleasure emanating from the top of my head). The eye movement I am describing is not like REM. It is rather slow and it is directed upwards. So, I guess my question is: what is this eye movement thing? Is it anywhere described? Is it a Jhana thing? a symptom of any stage of the path? Thanks!

The previous years of my life feels like a dream. I was happily living, consumed with studies, learning things, watching youtube and stuff, enjoying a lot, mind was busy in various entertaining stuffs. But, I don't know how it started, but all those passions are waning. Its almost as if I've forgotten how to live. Live as in the previous ways of my living. I am now trying to find a way to live as I've lived in the past but can't seem to go back to the old ways. I mean I want to find something fun for my mind as I had in the past but I just cant bring up enough passion. What is happening to me ?

I am asking this in reference to the aircraft that crashed in India. Is there anything like collective karma, like the alayavijnana (Collective Consciousness)? ( I should not say this, but...) Like, sometimes the entire community suffers, like the Jews in the Second World War. Or sometimes there is an earthquake, natural disasters...If the dependent origination is correct, then should there be a reason behind the mass suffering?

Psychedelic substances such as psilocybin or LSD often induce experiences described as "ego death," where the usual sense of self dissolves and a feeling of unity or boundlessness arises. Some interpret these states as glimpses of spiritual truth, potentially similar to Buddhist insights into anattā (non-self) or śūnyatā (emptiness). From a Buddhist perspective, are these chemically induced experiences considered valid insights into the nature of self and reality, or are they fundamentally different from the realizations attained through traditional Buddhist practice? Are there teachings or commentaries that address the nature or value of such experiences?

In the Nikāyas, consciousness is often described as a dependently originated phenomenon. It arises in dependence on conditions such as nāma-rūpa and the sense bases. For instance - > "Just as fire is classified simply by whatever requisite condition in > dependence on which it burns — a fire that burns in dependence on wood > is classified simply as a wood-fire, a fire that burns in dependence > on wood-chips is classified simply as a wood-chip-fire; a fire that > burns in dependence on grass is classified simply as a grass-fire; a > fire that burns in dependence on cow-dung is classified simply as a > cow-dung-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on chaff is classified > simply as a chaff-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on rubbish is > classified simply as a rubbish-fire — in the same way, consciousness > is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which > it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms > is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Consciousness that arises > in dependence on the ear & sounds is classified simply as > ear-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the nose > & aromas is classified simply as nose-consciousness. Consciousness > that arises in dependence on the tongue & flavors is classified simply > as tongue-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on > the body & tactile sensations is classified simply as > body-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the > intellect & ideas is classified simply as intellect-consciousness." ~ MN 38 However, in DN 15 and many other suttas in descriptions of the formless attainments, the Buddha also speaks of a “dimension of the infinitude of consciousness”, which one enters after the dimension of infinite space. > “Having completely surmounted the base of the infinity of space, > (contemplating) ‘Consciousness is infinite,’ one enters and dwells in > the base of the infinity of consciousness. This is the fifth > emancipation. > > “Having completely surmounted the base of the infinity of > consciousness, (contemplating) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > dwells in the base of nothingness. This is the sixth emancipation. Given the standard teaching that consciousness does not exist apart from conditions:- If consciousness is entirely conditioned and dependent, how should we understand this “dimension of the infinitude of consciousness”? what does it mean to speak of a dimension of its infinitude? Does it come under the intellect-consciousness of MN 38 Or is it something different? Who or what is the one who “enters” these dimensions one after another? is it simply the stream of consciousness, or is there an implied experiencer with continuity beyond the aggregates? ---------- I am seeking canonical, commentarial, or scholarly interpretations that reconcile DN 15’s description of the “dimension of the infinitude of consciousness” with the early Buddhist principle of dependent origination. Is this dimension to be understood phenomenologically, as part of meditative experience, or does it suggest a more nuanced conception of consciousness that is distinct from the aggregates?

> 僧問藥山：「平田淺草，麈鹿成群。如何射得麈中麈？」山云：「看箭！」僧放身便倒。山云：「侍者拖出這死漢。」僧便走。山云：「弄泥團漢有什麼限？」 > > A monk asked Yakusan, “On an open plain with shallow grass, elk and deer form a herd. How does one shoot the Elk of Elks?” Yakusan said, “Watch the arrow!” The monk let himself fall. Yakusan said, “Attendants, please drag this dead fellow out.” The monk chose to walk away. Yakusan said, “Fellows who play with mud balls know no bounds.” Master Yakusan pretends to shoot an arrow. The monk in the story lets himself fall. Master Yakusan apparently was not happy with the monk’s response. What should the monk have done instead?

It's obvious what stealing is when engaged-in often. You take the stuff of others while under a certain mental state, that mental state being marked and noticeable by an understanding that something isn't under your possession (but under another's), and physical effort to appropriate it regardless of the other person's wishes. So if someone is happy with you 'stealing' something, is that stealing? In general, no, as this would be a gift. On the other hand, we have situations such as copyright law, or other ideas where the line of 'possession' is inappropriately drawn. So here is the problem. What is the meter by which we can say something is stolen or not? It can't be the sweeping idea, 'this is my property', as that idea can be faked, as in the case of intellectual property. It can be a case where there is appropriate and inappropriate mental possession of items, and stealing only being the violation of the appropriate lines. Is it fully intent? Kamma = Intent, so if you do not engage in the intent of stealing, you will not experience the results. However, what if you are someone who considers smelling the flowers of another individual stealing? Surely that would not be considered stealing, yet to that person smelling the flowers would trigger the intent. Even though that coarse mental intent would arise, as far as I know that is not actual stealing, so the 'non-intent stealing' would not have an object. At which point can you say you are actually stealing, and at which you are not? It is really simple with coarse events but hard with complex contexts. Taking an apple from someone without asking is stealing, but what about abusing sales at a market? - what about when those sales are glitches, unintended, in the system? - what about liberally charging a corporate card? For our modern, daily situations a really subtle understanding of the precepts is required. So where is the subtle line of stealing?

My decrease in creativity does most likely not have anything to do with my feeble meditation attempts, because it is natural to have ups and downs, even when it comes to creativity. But still, meditation deals with ridding oneself of attachments by observing mind states objectively and I think that following through an idea and turning it into a finished piece of work requires quite a lot of attachment and devotion to the project. I suppose my real question is: is it possible to balance being a practicing Buddhist and a creative artist?

> “There is, monks, an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned. If, > monks there were not that unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned, you > could not know an escape here from the born, become, made, and > conditioned. But because there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, > unconditioned, therefore you do know an escape from the born, become, > made, and conditioned.” ~ Ud 8.3 In contemporary discussions—particularly outside of Buddhist contexts, this passage is sometimes interpreted in a theistic or metaphysical sense, as pointing to an eternal, uncreated reality or an absolute ground of being that exists independently and “allows” for liberation.From this perspective, the statement “if there were not that unborn…” is read as implying a foundational ontological ground upon which conditioned phenomena depend. Within a Buddhist doctrinal framework, however, Nibbāna is often said to be neither a self nor a substance, and Buddhism explicitly rejects a creator God and eternal metaphysical essences. - Within early Buddhist doctrine, why is Nibbāna described using terms such as “unborn” and “unconditioned,” rather than simply as the cessation of suffering or defilements? - How should the conditional phrasing “If there were not that unborn…” be understood without reifying Nibbāna into an eternal substance or theistic absolute? - How do traditional Buddhist commentaries address or guard against eternalist or theistic readings of this passage?

Confidence, For a few weeks now, I have lost confidence in almost everything. Like doing even simple stuff. I feel like, I can't. Like, no future. Motivation, For few weeks now, I feel like sleeping or meditating in bed. Like being free from any work or doing any stuff. Why can't I be happy mentally only?. For reference, I did Samantha, Vipssana for the last 4 years, when I have time.

I have been interested in the Dzogchen practice of Thogal. Would you suggest any sources or web-sites about this?

In the Cūḷasuññatasutta (MN 121) , the Buddha discusses a meditative attainment characterized by “nothingness” which is then used as a predicate in an analysis of emptiness. > Furthermore, a mendicant—ignoring the perception of the dimension of > infinite space and the perception of the dimension of infinite > consciousness—focuses on the oneness dependent on the perception of > the dimension of nothingness. Their mind leaps forth, gains > confidence, settles down, and becomes decided in that perception of > the dimension of nothingness. They understand: ‘Here there is no > stress due to the perception of the dimension of infinite space or the > perception of the dimension of infinite consciousness. There is only > this modicum of stress, namely the oneness dependent on the perception > of the dimension of nothingness.’ They understand: ‘This field of > perception is empty of the perception of the dimension of infinite > space. It is empty of the perception of the dimension of infinite > consciousness. There is only this that is not emptiness, namely the > oneness dependent on the perception of the dimension of nothingness.’ > And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what > remains they understand that it is present. That’s how emptiness > manifests in them—genuine, undistorted, and pure. I am interested in an investigation that addresses such issues as: **Ontological status of “nothingness”:** ---------------------------------------- Is the sphere of nothingness presented as a phenomenal object of experience, a negation of specified classes of objects (e.g., form, infinite space, infinite consciousness), or as a structural absence of cognitive content? Phenomenological description: ----------------------------- In the Cūḷasuññatasutta, the meditator attends to the dimension of nothingness. How is it possible for the mind to intentionally “perceive” something that is, by definition, an absence? Does the sutta imply a particular structure of consciousness that allows an absence to be an object of experience? Nothingness and self-reference ------------------------------ In perceiving nothingness, does the meditator’s mind retain any self-referential awareness, or is subjectivity suspended? How does the sutta articulate the boundaries of selfhood and cognitive agency in relation to the sphere of nothingness? Temporal and spatial character of nothingness --------------------------------------------- The sutta uses the term āyatana, often translated as “dimension” or “sphere.” Does this imply that this nothingness has a kind of temporal or spatial extension, or is it entirely devoid of such characteristics?

Daniel Brown, on p. 6 of *Pointing Out the Great Way*, says this (emphasis added)... > **The Pali word typically translated as “suffering” is dukkha, which > could also be rendered as “reactivity.”** For, as we experience events > unfolding in our stream of consciousness moment-by-moment, the > ordinary mind reacts based on ingrained habits. If the event is > experienced as pleasant, the mind habitually gravitates toward the > event. If it is experienced as unpleasant, the mind pushes it away. In > Buddhism these automatic reactive tendencies are referred to as > clinging and aversion, and lapses in the continuity of awareness are > called nonawareness, or ignorance. Together these “three poisons” mark > every moment of ordinary experience. They are habitual. They obscure > the mind’s natural condition from us and in so doing become the > fundamental cause of everyday unhappiness. In other words, Buddhism > defines everyday unhappiness in terms of a habitual dysfunction in the > way we process our experience. Seen in this way, it can be identified > and corrected, and the root of everyday unhappiness can be eradicated. **My question: Is there a *linguistic* or *philological* basis for translating "dukkha" as "reactivity"?** Or is Brown being a bit loose here, reflecting the dynamic that he explains -- reactivity underlies dukkha.

Do I intend to do something if I also intend to stop myself from doing it? Suppose I intend to eat the hamburger, but also intend to stop myself doing so. Is that intent in the Buddhist sense?

In Abhidharma (“abhi-” roughly means “meta-,” so Abhidharma can be understood as meta-dharma, or “one level above dharma”), there is a concept called kṣaṇabhaṅga, or “momentary decay.” It holds that all existence lasts only for a split second, and this includes human beings. A related term is ēkacitta, or “one unit of consciousness,” according to which consciousness arises in discrete units rather than as a continuous stream. Under this understanding, is it fair to say that each person dies and is reborn from one split second to the next?

Is metta contained in the compassion practices of Zen and if so, does that mean that compassion is loving kindness in Zen? How does Zen approach the Bramha Viharas in comparison to Theravada and Vajrayana?

Definitions: - I want to emphasize the mind, the body doesn't ache, isn't sore, isn't itchy, nothing at all; that is the 'an lạc' of the body (bodily ease/well-being). - 'Thanh thản' (serenity) is when our mind doesn't ponder, isn't busy at all; that is 'thanh thản'. - 'Vô sự' (actionlessness/nothing-to-do) is doing nothing at all; the body also does nothing, and the mind also doesn't ponder, meaning it does nothing; that is 'vô sự'. It is normal, very normal like a normal person, yet doing nothing at all. That is: the head/mind doesn't work, and the hands and feet also don't work; that is 'vô sự'. As for the mind that doesn't ponder, doesn't worry about anything at all, that is 'thanh thản' (serenity). As for the body that doesn't ache, isn't sore, itchy, nothing at all, that is 'an lạc' (ease); it is normal. Just like right now, [if] our body has no aches or pains, that is the 'an lạc' of our body. That is the state right now; it's not anything strange or different. It is the normalcy of a normal human being. Therefore, once you recognize that normalcy, now you just need to use the method of Right Thinking (Như Lý Tác Ý), guide it [the mind]: > "A mind unshaken, serene, at ease, and free from involvement.” You just fear it [the mind] will move and ponder about this and that, so you remind it: ‘Mind immovable, serene, at ease, actionless,’ and then just sit relaxedly/idly like that. So, can I use "unshaken, serene, at ease, uninvolved" as a mindful reminder throughout my day to make my mind feel better?

Does anyone know of a good summary of the Visuddhimagga? Is *"Loosening the Tangle" A meditator’s guide to the Visuddhimagga by Ian Rose* a good summary?