Suppose a being has been corrupted completely that is it 1. Lacks buddhi 2. Inner conscience is dead 3. Has calcified heart of ego 4. No spiritual vision (complete blindness) The fault is that it willfully rejcted dharma and wilfully closing eyes to truth due to mahamoh (In simpler terms it has become soulless) Is this soul eternally damned in Buddhist philosophy as well as considered in western religions of Christianity, Islam and even in Hinduism as TAMO YOGYA coz the nature of soul has become fit for darkness

Years ago I came across a Sanskrit term that described the exchange or interaction of a buddhist and art. I am desperate to remember that term. It described engaging with art work in the present moment as though the piece was alive in you and you were alive in the piece. The term defined a mutual exchange of presence. Can anyone help me with recalling this term?

The question is about power strategy and vulnerability. Put differently: We know the Buddha taught us how to guard the sense doors, but did he ever describe the specific traps or manipulative techniques used by the unscrupulous (false friends, deceptive teachers, or corrupt leaders) to encourage us to leave those doors wide open? I am particularly interested in references to the *uninstructed worldling* in this context.

If I remember correctly, there is a text where the Buddha called a monk "janitor" for being devoted to cleaning. It's probably in the Dhammapada commentary, but I am not sure. Two monks ordained. One spent his time practicing whereas the other was cleaning a lot and criticizing the meditator.

Buddha’s pedagogical strategy is famously defined by his refusal to engage in speculative metaphysics. We see this consistently in the Pali Canon, most notably in the Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta (MN 63) with the parable of the poisoned arrow, the Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta (MN 72), and throughout the Abyakata Samyutta. , dismissing them as a "thicket of views" that do not lead to Unbinding. However, this silence left significant "tectonic" gaps in Buddhist doctrine. For instance, while the Buddha somewhat implictly rejected a creator god in the Bhuridatta Jataka or through the critique of theistic determinism in the Tittha Sutta (AN 3.61), he did not provide a definitive cosmological alternative that could withstand the rigorous formal logic of the theistic darshanas such as Nyaya. Similarly, his refusal to answer Vacchagotta in the Ananda Sutta (SN 44.10) on whether the self exists fearing that an affirmation would support eternalism and a denial would lead to annihilationism—left the status of the "person" (puggala) in a state of precarious ambiguity. The Anattalakkhana Sutta (SN 22.59) deconstructs the aggregates, but stops short of defining the "subject" of karmic continuity. Historically, this lack of a rigid metaphysical scaffold became a liability. To thrive in the competitive intellectual landscape of ancient India, a tradition required royal patronage, which was often granted based on victory in public debates. Buddhism’s early quietism left it vulnerable to the highly sophisticated, rigorous systems of Nyaya, Mimamsa, and the burgeoning Vedanta. Rival schools attacked Buddhist doctrines as nihilistic or incoherent. To quote for instance from the Vedanta sutra bhashya of Shankaracharya , A stalwart of Vedanta:- > whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested with > reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the > walls of a well dug in sandy soil. **It has, in fact, no foundation > whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in > the practical concerns of life are mere folly.**--**Moreover, Buddha by > propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching > respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas > only, and general nothingness, has himself made it clear either that > he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred > of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting > which they would become thoroughly confused.**--So that--and this the > Sûtra means to indicate--Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely > disregarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness. To survive, later Buddhist scholars were forced to construct the very epistemological and metaphysical frameworks the Buddha had avoided. The consequence of filling these "gaps" was a profound fragmentation. We see Dignaga and Dharmakirti developing complex epistemologies involving the concept of svasamvedana (self-reflexive awareness) to defend the validity of perception, and counter Naiyayikas yet this was later vehemently denied by Prasangika Madhyamaka thinkers viewing it as a subtle reintroduction of a "self" through the back door of logic. The Pudgalavada (Personalist) sects emerged claiming a "person" exists as a conceptual reality to bridge the gap between anattā and karma, a move the Theravadins and Sarvastivadins viewed as heresy. At the same time, while Theravada remained more or less non-theistic, Mahayanists introduced concepts like the Adibuddha which is indistinguishable from the God or Brahman of hinduism. ---------- This compels us to ask the question - Was the fragmentation of Buddhism into contradictory subsects an inevitable consequence of the Buddha's refusal to provide a systematic metaphysics? If the Buddha had provided a precise, non-negotiable metaphysical framework and answered the "unanswered questions" with the same clarity he applied to the Four Noble Truths—could the radical fragmentation and internal polemics of the Buddhist tradition have been avoided?

Hello Beautiful People, I have a quick question. After years of meditating with a mixture of Mahasi and Goenka style, I would like to ask the following. Very often when I sit to mediate, it is a matter of seconds to experience a subtle sense of pleasure and/or spaciousness. But more interestingly, is that after meditating a bit more there comes a feeling that my eyes want to move upwards, almost like if they want to see behind my head/brain. The first times this eye movement happened, years ago, there was fear in me because this was unusual and unexpected - it was even a bit painful. But after letting this movement happen, I realized that the traditional lights, pleasure, and spaciousness became more present. Sometimes this leads to a very focalized pleasure spot at the top of my head and sometimes to the feeling that a very strong and interesting sense of pleasure would come from that spot (like if there is a cascade of pleasure emanating from the top of my head). The eye movement I am describing is not like REM. It is rather slow and it is directed upwards. So, I guess my question is: what is this eye movement thing? Is it described anywhere? Is it a Jhana thing? Is it a symptom of any stage of the path? Thanks!

I read the following on the internet: > Ucchedavāda is the view that there is no afterlife; or specifically that there is no rebirth (and by association no karma). While Buddhaghosa's commentary to DN 1 asserts the above, which was later corrected by Dhammapala's secondary commentary, where in the Suttas is this idea found? Exactly where did the Buddha say ucchedavāda is the view there is no afterlife?

Every book that I have read about Buddhism and medititation says that, as meditation cultivates concentration and awareness, one should never fall asleep while doing it. So, what about when I cannot sleep? Can't I meditate to help me sleep, or only *before* I go to bed? (I mostly practice Vipassana meditation)

In AN 9.34 (Nibbānasukhasutta) , the following exchange appears:- > There he addressed the mendicants: “Reverends, extinguishment is > bliss! Extinguishment is bliss!” > > When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But Reverend > Sāriputta, what’s blissful about it, since **nothing is felt?**” > > “The fact that **nothing is felt** is precisely what’s blissful about it. This seems to describe nibbāna, the highest attainment in Buddhism, in terms of the absence or cessation of all sensory perceptions. However, in MN 152 (Indriyabhāvanāsutta) , the Buddha is seen criticizing a teaching that appears to aim at suppressing sensory experience:- > "Then the student Uttara, a pupil of the brahmin Pārāsariya, > approached the Buddha, and exchanged greetings with him. When the > greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side. > The Buddha said to him, “Uttara, does Pārāsariya teach his disciples > the development of the faculties?” > > “He does, worthy Gotama.” > > “But how does he teach it?” > > “Worthy Gotama, it’s when the eye sees no sight and the ear hears no > sound." > > “In that case, Uttara, a blind person and a deaf person will have > developed faculties according to what Pārāsariya says. For a blind > person sees no sight with the eye and a deaf person hears no sound > with the ear.” . When he said this, Uttara sat silent, > dismayed, shoulders drooping, downcast, depressed, with nothing to > say. " On one occasion, the Buddha seems to disapprove of a practice aimed at eliminating sense activity, while on another, nibbāna itself is being described in terms that suggest the cessation of all sensory phenomena. Is this not a contradiction? How should these passages be understood together?

The first part of my question is in the title. For example, if I have an emotion of fear on whether my colleague will steal my spot, is this to be abandoned? The second question is if there should also be no actions of rivalry. For example, if you find yourself openly opposing someone, should you stop this action? Feel free to define rivalry in whichever way you please.

Some monks end their life not in protest of oppressive government, but because of a wish to end their life. For example Bhikkhu Samahita, who ended his life a month after his father died. Monks, who are much deeper into the dhamma than myself, killing themselves due to suffering, strikes worry in me. Previously I was in comfort of believing that people who are ahead of me on the path feel relatively free of suffering. It motivated me to keep going. But with hearing that buddhist monks are seemingly plagued by the same suffering, I am starting to reconsider whether the dhamma is sufficient in handling suffering or not. How to reconcile?

"When the iron bird flies and horses run on wheels, the dharma will come to the land of the red faces" is a quote from ~700AD that is too good to check. It is also the title of a reasonably good documentary about Tibetan Buddhism in the US. Google already said that the "iron bird" is actually the name of a year. What is the surrounding context of this quote?

On [this](https://tricycle.org/beginners/decks/pure-land/?continue=1) website, it is stated: > The Pure Land tradition is founded on **three sutras** and two commentaries: **the Sutra on Immeasurable Life**, also known as the Larger Pure Land Sutra; **the Amida Sutra**, also known as the Smaller Pure Land Sutra; and **the Contemplation Sutra**. The two commentaries are Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the Sutra of Immeasurable Life and Shandao’s Commentary on the Contemplation Sutra. Assuming someone acknowledges the Āgama and its form of the Pali canon, are the 3 sutras the only sutras that are, let's say "mandatory" for Pure Land Buddhism, while the rest of the Mahayana sutras are optional? Or are other sutras held as canonical and also "mandatory" to acknowledge and believe in?

I'm new to studying Tibetan Buddhism. I'd like to ask how the Cittamatra doctrine is *practiced* in the Gelug school? I'm not referring to the hierarchy this school establishes of Yogacara as a preliminary step to studying Madhyamika Prasangika, but rather if some of the analyses presupposed by Cittamatra are *practiced yogically*; is it done this way, or is it more of a scholarly, theoretical study, to then assimilate it into a larger framework within Madhyamika? Thank you for your help.

My question is subtle. When we meditate we move our body because of some physical pain . My question is why its so painful to keep my mind on breath . Its not physical pain then what type of pain we face when we try to keep our mind on beath away from distraction.

I am very new to Buddhism, I wouldn't call myself a Buddhist but I am learning about the religion. While reading, "In the Buddha's words" by Bikku Bodhi I started to think about the action of letting go suffering, but how could a traumatized person let go of sufferance if it is something they can not control even if they have healed from it?

The art below is technically Manichaean, but the artist is clearly familiar with the Buddhist visual vocabulary (was found in Southern China I believe): Regardless, the question I have boils down to scripture only: **Question**: Is there anywhere within Buddhist canonical or apocryphyal traditions that describes demons or other malign entities with the imagery of black clouds or black auras?

In SN 22.59 the following passage is to be seen- > You should truly see any kind of consciousness at all—past, future, or > present; internal or external; solid or subtle; inferior or superior; > far or near: all consciousness—with right understanding: ‘This is not > mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’ Given classical Buddhist doctrine is often said to avoid both extremes of eternalism and nihilism, how is this teaching to be interpreted in a way that avoids collapsing into nihilism (ucchedavāda)?

In early Buddhist texts, there are instances when Nirvana is explicitly referred to as an “element” (nibbāna-dhātu) for instance in the Nibbānadhātusutta. Ud 8.1 likewise seems to refer to it as a sense object (ayatana) This terminology is confusing to me. If Nirvana is the cessation of all aggregates and not a conditioned phenomenon, calling it an “element” makes it sound like some kind of ultimate existent or metaphysical substrate. How should the term “element” (dhātu) be understood in this context. Is it meant in a strictly technical sense within early Buddhist thought, or is it more of a conventional designation for the cessation of processes rather than something that exists as a thing.

Usually when someone pushes back against me, I feel displeasure, and I am very reactive. I say something defensive in response, but then, I yield entirely from the subject or area in which I was pushed back against. My ego tries to frame this yielding as being egoless, but obviously, it is just to protect the ego. How can I remain in such a conflict of interest without either yielding, or letting my ego influence the conflict? For example, if at work, my ego has attached itself to some submission, and someone points out things they feel are worthy of change in the submission. How can I remain objective, without jumping the gun (applying the suggested changes immediately, or rejecting it outright, or yielding from the submission entirely)? When I happen upon a pushback, the first few moments are of clarity. "Oh, I see, interesting". But then slowly it irks me and I become rejective. Then, after I push back, I go "this is too much, how will people perceive me after I pushed back, I'm so confrontational, I gotta leave/yield".