Growing up, I had a general understanding—based on lay textbooks and common interpretations that the dharmic religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism all believe in reincarnation: the idea that an individual is reborn into a new body, either human or animal, after physical death of the body. As I became more interested in Buddhism and tried exploring it more deeply, I noticed that different Buddhists seem to explain this concept in very different ways. Some use the word "reincarnation" and appear to mean it quite literally, while others insist that "rebirth" in Buddhism is not the same as reincarnation, especially since Buddhism denies the existence of a permanent self. This has left me quite confused. Is rebirth just another term for reincarnation, or does Buddhism teach something fundamentally different? What is the correct way to understand the concept of rebirth in Buddhist teachings?

I'm at the end of my rope mentally on this topic and I figured I try here. The question is based on another one I asked on the main philosophy thread: [Does Buddhism say that you are "everything"?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/136116/does-buddhism-say-that-you-are-everything/136136?noredirect=1#comment440151_136136) on Philosophy Stack Exchange. I don't know if you can read the medium article but the short version is that the guy says you don't exist/ nothing exists because nothing can exist in a void. That everything is dependent on something else and nothing has an independent existence. This leads him to then say everything is one, or something like that. I quoted the relevant segment in the thread. When I ask others I get various responses, like saying "everything is one" is a misunderstanding of the teachings, to saying that dependent arising doesn't mean nothing exists. I don't really get it. If you read the comments in the medium article I'm not sure they get it either. The whole thing has me seeing life as pointless, because if nothing exists then there is nothing to do. It's got me apathetic to myself, people, things, because none of it "Exists" and it's all one. I've met others who don't feel or think this way but I really don't know how else to look at it. I mean if "I" and others don't exist then it doesn't matter what happens to me or other people right? I just don't understand, I'd appreciate explanations in the simplest way you can put it if it's possible. I've been in and out of Buddhism for years and I just cannot grasp what the teachings say, let alone when others interpret it.

1. What is your view regarding svasaṃvedana? Do you accept or deny (the existence of) svasaṃvedana? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svasaṃvedana https://encyclopediaofbuddhism.org/wiki/Svasaṃvedana 2. Can a Buddhist know whether or not he/she have really genuine and firm bodhicitta **by him-/her- self**? If yes, then how? (Does this question have to do with svasaṃvedana?)

In AN1.51-52 , we find a description of the luminous mind. The Pali version can be found here . The description in 51-52 implies that it is pre-existing. It's just that the ordinary worldling doesn't discern that it's actually present. But the noble disciples discern that it's actually present. "yathābhūtaṃ " means "in truth; in reality; in its real essence." "pajānāti " means "knows clearly". We know that Nibbana is not conditioned (sankhara) and not impermanent (anicca). But from the description, it sounds like the luminous mind, which is pre-existing in both worldlings and noble disciples, is always there, just that it is obscured by incoming defilements (kilesa). Does this mean that the luminous mind is also not conditioned (sankhara) and not impermanent (anicca)? > “Pabhassa­ra­midaṃ, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. Tañca kho āgantukehi > upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ. Taṃ assutavā puthujjano yathābhūtaṃ > nappajānāti. Tasmā ‘assutavato puthujjanassa cittabhāvanā natthī’ti > vadāmī”ti. > > “Pabhassa­ra­midaṃ, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. Tañca kho āgantukehi > upakkilesehi vippamuttaṃ. Taṃ sutavā ariyasāvako yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. > Tasmā ‘sutavato ariyasāvakassa cittabhāvanā atthī’ti vadāmī”ti. > > “Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming > defilements. The uninstructed run-of-the-mill person doesn’t discern > that as it actually is present, which is why I tell you that—for the > uninstructed run-of-the-mill person—there is no development of the > mind.” > > “Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming > defilements. The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns > that as it actually is present, which is why I tell you that—for the > well-instructed disciple of the noble ones—there is development of the > mind.”

I read the following excerpt from a text on the internet - > Hindu philosophers generally classify all tattvas or categories into > 36 or 96, **of these the lowest 24 are the elements , Tanmatras , > Karmendrya , Jnanendrya , Antakarana (Chitta , Manas , Ahankara > and Buddhi ). As it is, the 24th is Buddhi tattva .** > > **It is this Tattva which the Buddhists affirm as the only truth and as > the highest truth- Beside and beyond this there is no other reality > higher or lower. All the 23 that are below the 24th tattva are only > phenomenally or momentarily true. If anybody were to assert that there > was anything higher than the Buddhi tattva, the Buddhist would regard > him as telling an untruth, as suggesting a fiction.** In the table of > Skandhas, Vijnana-skandha is one of them; but this Vijnana-skandha is > merely the six kinds of sensations or knowledge perceived by the five > external senses and Buddhi as the sixth sense. **As such this Vijnana is > only derived from Buddhi and what would be regarded as born of Maya or > matter. To confound therefore this material Vijnana with the Vijnana > of the Upanishads as meaning the non-material Atma is highly > unscientific.** Passing beyond the 24th tattva, the Hindus postulate > Guna which means attribute or quality. This is the quality of the > Mulaprakriti. This guna is divided into Satva, Rajas, and Tamas and > when the soul is clothed with these three gunas it attains its > distinctive individuality. Though this guna gives him the peculiar > individuality, the soul in its own nature is distinct from the three > gunas. Is the quoted claim that Buddhists treat something equivalent to Buddhi-tattva as the highest truth a correct represenation of the Buddhist position or does it strawman the position of buddhism? Based on my limited knowledge, Buddhism too seems to have its own hierarchy of meditative attainments such as sphere of infinite space, sphere of infinite consciousness, sphere of nothingness, and sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception etc beyond all of which is Nirvana. So shouldn't the buddhist nirvana be beyond any form of conditioned intellect (Buddhi-tattva ) as is being claimed? Correct me if i am wrong

I asked this question on the Philosophy StackExchange, as some belief systems have deep belief that everything is on a spectrum of polarity/opposites: - [What philosophies don't say things boil down to polarities (opposites)?](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/118562/what-philosophies-dont-say-things-boil-down-to-polarities-opposites) What does Buddhism say about polarities/opposites? Does everything have an opposite? If so, how? I have several examples in my linked question, of what I think cannot be polarities: > I have thought a little about this and it appears that there are not > just polarities, but at least 3 classes of property values: > > 1. [On-off values](https://gist.github.com/lancejpollard/aa3b2eb6d03c997c6c42c214bf8c6701) > (not opposites, but a single property like "itchy" or "spikey", which > can have "more" or "less" of an intensity. _There is no opposite to > itchy or spikey._ At least the way I look at things. If you say > "non-itchy" as an opposite, what does that even mean? Basically it > boils down to "no value" or "some value", of one property. > 2. [Opposite values](https://gist.github.com/lancejpollard/5cd76ba84a1773fcd9228565baeb3423) . > These are your typical "polarities" like hot/cold, bright/dim, > heavy/light, etc.. Each is a single property with a pair of values on > a spectrum, ranging from one side to the other. > 3. Multidimensional values. These are things like "color", which has at least red/blue/green (rgb, 3 values ranging from 0-255 on modern > computers), or hue/saturation/lightness (hsl). I think most > "properties" belong to this category TBH, but I can't think of many > more. In coding, these are "data models" or "types with attributes".

What are the rules or guidelines on how a Buddhist should engage with others who would like to discuss philosophies, beliefs, ideas, and practices of other religions or belief systems? - Are Buddhists allowed to discuss / engage in the ideas to some degree? Or is it shunned. - How does Buddhism incorporate ideas outside the main canon / system? _(Generally speaking)_ - Are certain topics to be never discussed? This would help me ask better questions to the Buddhism community in general, but also would serve as a gauge as to how to interact. Basically, what is acceptable conversation topics in the end.

Across Buddhist traditions, liberation (nirvāṇa/nibbāna) is presented as the cessation of suffering through insight into the nature of reality. However, there appears to be substantial disagreement both within the tradition and in modern scholarship over whether this requires substantive ontological commitments. In the early discourses of the Pāli Canon, the Buddha famously refuses to answer speculative metaphysical questions (e.g., the “undeclared questions” in the Cūḷamālukya Sutta), framing the Dhamma as therapeutically oriented toward the cessation of dukkha. This has led some interpreters to read early Buddhism as anti-metaphysical or methodologically quietist. Yet the path itself seems to require insight into doctrines such as dependent origination paṭiccasamuppāda,anattā, and anicca. These appear to function not merely as pragmatic heuristics but as claims about how things actually are. Later traditions intensify this tension:- - The Abhidharma systems of schools such as the Sarvāstivāda develop highly detailed ontologies of dharmas, seemingly grounding liberation in precise metaphysical analysis. - In contrast, Madhyamaka, especially as articulated by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, appears to deconstruct all ontological positions including those that might underwrite soteriology itself while maintaining that such deconstruction is indispensable for liberation. This raises a structural problem: If liberation requires “seeing things as they are” (yathābhūta-ñāṇadassana), does this not presuppose some metaphysical or ontological account of what ultimately exists or how phenomena are structured? Can a “metaphysics-free” Buddhism be coherent, or does the very logic of liberation require at least minimal ontological commitments?

Are there good apologetic resources (books, audios, sites, etc.) that give the buddhist answer to advaita vedanta and/or hinduism in general? To the substantial model of the atman-brahman or purusha/prakriti of Patanjali yoga. I understand that in the West, Whitehead's criticisms were quite close.

While reading through the Buddhist suttas, I came across the detailed descriptions of the eight emancipations. These passages were deeply intriguing, but they also gave rise to some questions in my mind which I decided to ask before which let me cite the concerned passages - > “Ānanda, there are these eight emancipations. Which eight? > > “**Possessed of form, one sees forms.** This is the first > emancipation. > > “**Not percipient of form internally, one sees forms externally.** > This is the second emancipation. > > “**One is intent only on the beautiful.** This is the third > emancipation. > > “**With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, > with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding > perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one > enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space**. This > is the fourth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.** This is > the fifth emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and > remains in the dimension of nothingness.** This is the sixth > emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor > non-perception.** This is the seventh emancipation. > > **“With the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, one enters and remains in the cessation > of perception and feeling.** This is the eighth emancipation. > > “**Now, when a monk attains these eight emancipations in forward > order, in reverse order, in forward and reverse order**, when he > attains them and emerges from them wherever he wants, however he > wants, and for as long as he wants, when through the ending of > effluents he enters and remains in the effluent-free release of > awareness and release of discernment, having directly known it and > realized it for himself in the here and now, **he is said to be a monk > released in both ways. And as for another release in both ways, higher > or more sublime than this, there is none.”** ~ DN 15 Questions- 1. Why is “nothingness” (6th) distinguished from “neither perception nor non-perception” (7th), given that both involve retreating from mental activity? Or from the 8th which involves total cessation of perception and feeling? 2. What kind of experience is “neither perception nor non-perception”? Is it a liminal state — and if so, how does one know they have entered it? Can a mind in this state be said to ‘experience’ anything at all? 3. In discussions with scholars from eternalist backgrounds, such as vedanta a common challenge raised is that the Buddhist teachings on the eight emancipations seem to imply the existence of a continuous or eternal subject since someone appears to be progressing through these subtle states of consciousness. If there is no eternal soul or self in Buddhism, then who is it that experiences and moves through these emancipations? How would a Buddhist respond to this objection? 4. What is the significance of being able to enter and exit these states at will, as emphasized in the sutta? 5. Is the progression through these states ultimately teaching that liberation is not something to be gained, but everything to be let go including perception, feeling, identity, and knowing?

I'm reading Rob Burbea's book Seeing That Frees. The book is about ways of working with emptiness. In the book, he says that things lack inherent existence. I'm fairly sure this isn't the same as not being real. Is that right? Can things be real and lack inherent existence? I appreciate the real answer will be to meditate on this, but I find exploring such issues more intellectually to be helpful too.

The Buddhist doctrinal term svasaṃvedana (literally “self-awareness” or reflexive awareness) plays a central role in classical Indian epistemology and Yogācāra theory of mind as defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. On their view, every act of intentional consciousness is non-conceptually self-aware in addition to being aware of its object, serving as the basis for memory, inference, and perceptual continuity. This reflexivity is often analogized to a lamp that illuminates both objects and itself. However, later Madhyamaka expositors, especially in the Gelug Prāsaṅgika tradition, critique or deny svasaṃvedana even at the conventional level, arguing that positing intrinsic reflexive awareness undermines the two truths and reifies mind. Other Madhyamaka authors, like Śāntarakṣita and Ju Mipham, articulate a more nuanced position where reflexive awareness may be accepted conventionally but denied ultimately. Is there a consistent way within Buddhist epistemology to reconcile Dharmakīrti’s reflexive awareness with Madhyamaka critiques without collapsing into either realism about mind or nihilism about experience? In other words, can svasaṃvedana be framed in a two-truths schema that satisfies both pramāṇa and madhyamaka concerns, and if so, how?

Some Scholars like R.S Bhattacharya claim that while Buddha rejected the Karma-kanda portions of the vedas, he spoke Highly of the Followers of Jnana-marga or nivritti-marga of vedas in the Brahmanadhammika Sutta. Is this really true? And Does This mean Buddha indirectly approved the Upanishadic philosophy of Atman-Brahman?

Prajñākaragupta (ca. 8th–9th century) was a Buddhist philosopher of the epistemological school and the author of the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, an extensive commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. In his epistemic interpretations, the wisdom of non‑duality (advaya‑jñāna) is presented as “the ultimate means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).” To quote from here :- > **At the core of Prajñākaragupta’s thought is the wisdom of non-duality > (advaya-jñana) which is the ultimate means of valid cognition > (pramāṇa).** Dharmakīrti had further defined "pramāṇa" as that which > illuminates unknown objects (ajñātārthaprakāśo vā) and as that which > is a "knowledge without deception" (avisaṃvādi jñānam). > **Prajñākaragupta states that "unknown objects" ultimately refers to the > ultimate object (paramārtha) which is a non-dual form (advaitarūpatā) > (PVA 79,15-17). This non-dual perception (advaita-dṛṣṭi) is what > ultimately leads to the end of suffering.** Prajñākaragupta identifies > it with what Dharmakīrti calls the insight (yukti) that leads to the > end of suffering (Pramāṇavārttika chapter II v. 139). Previous > commentators had mainly aligned this with not-self. Prajñākaragupta > agrees, but also gives an alternative explanation: "yukti is union > (yoga), which means that all phenomena are interconnected beyond all > differences, that is, non-duality (advaita)" (PVA 116,16-19). **For > Prajñākaragupta, all other forms of Buddhist epistemology which do not > discuss non-duality are ways to gradually lead a person to higher and > subtler levels of wisdom, culminating in the nondual cognition** > (advaitāvabodha). ---------- Questions for Discussion:- 1. Does Prajñākaragupta’s non‑dual reading implicitly reify a kind of absolute awareness or self‑like substratum that diverges from the Buddha’s teaching of anatta? Given that Prajñākaragupta uses advaitarūpatā to characterize the ultimate object of cognition and posits an ultimate lack of distinction between knower and known, is this formulation closer to a form of non‑dual eternalism rather than strict Buddhist no‑self? 2. Can his interpretation genuinely be reconciled with the early Buddhist elimination of a permanent self? ----------

Among the various pramāṇas, or means of valid knowledge in Indian epistemologies, it is generally accepted that Buddhism recognizes two pramāṇas. As stated thus :- > Many schools of Buddhism posit two forms of pramāṇa: > > **direct perception (pratyakṣa) and > inference (anumāna)** > > **Direct perception is a non-conceptual cognition that directly > apprehends an object, and inference is based on reasoning.** However, this approach of reliance on only two pramāṇas, coupled with the rejection of scriptural or Vedic testimony (śabda-pramāṇa), has over the time drawn criticism from numerous rival schools among which the most prominent have been the Vedāntic commentators and theologians. This may be seen for instance from a brief study of some Anucchedas of the Tattva-sandarbha, a work of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī, a Vaiṣṇava theologian and Vedāntin of the Acintya-bhedābheda school. In the relevant section, while elaborating on the epistemology of his tradition he lists the flaws with all other means of knowledge such perception and inference. Tattva Sandarbha Anuccheda 9 Therefore owing to these defects, the only valid sources of knowledge about the Absolute (the ultimate truth or God) are the Vedas or Vedic scriptures, which are considered by tradition to be apauruṣeya (authorless) since they are supposed to have manifested directly from God, perfect, and transmitted through an unbroken paramparā (disciplic succession). Further, in order to establish the superiority of scriptural authority (śabda-pramāṇa) over logical reasoning or inference, a number of proofs are cited. In the Lengthy commentary to the 10th anuccheda, it may be seen in particular that the criticism is directed at the Standpoint of the Buddhists - > The Vedas (sabda-pramana ) are the only effective means for acquiring > transcendental knowledge. **The Vedas inform us about the soul's > existence beyond the body**, about the planets of the spiritual world, > and about the Supreme Lord, , His pastimes, and other matters. All > these subjects are beyond the reach of our sensory and mental > faculties. > **Philosophers such as the Buddhists, who do not accept the Vedas, > cannot justifiably say anything positive about transcendence, let > alone the way to attain it without sabda. Sabda-pramana (i.e > Vedic/Scriptural testimony) is so important that although Vaisnavas > count Lord Buddha among the incarnations of the Lord on the strength > of Vedic testimony, they reject His philosophy because it is not based > on sabda-pramana.** ~ Commentary to Anuccheda 10 Similarly the Buddhist View of the momentariness of consciousness too is criticised Elsewhere in the same work as - > **The Vedanta explains that when a person looks at an object there > arises a particular mental state, called vrtti, which the soul > perceives. The mental state itself is not the perceiver. But the > Buddhists, lacking all knowledge about the soul, mistake this > temporary, ever-changing vrtti, which is noneternal ever-constantly > changing, for real consciousness.** This point is further clarified with > the analogy of the life air. Air is one, but air within the body has > various names, such as prana, apana, and samana, according to the > function it performs. Similarly, the soul is one, but while in the > body it manifests consciousness, which appears many-branched and > ever-changing. For example, sweetened cow's milk gives rise to > different mental states when perceived with different senses: to the > eyes it is white, to the tongue sweet, and so on. So it is only the > mental state, affected by varieties of sense perception, that appears > and disappears. The living entity is a fractional part of the Supreme > Lord, and since the Lord is conscious and eternal, the living entity > must have these qualities as well, in as much as a gold nugget shares > the qualities of the mother lode. The purpose of explaining the > conscious and eternal quality of the soul with logic and personal > experience is to help us develop an understanding of the Supersoul. ~ Commentary to Anuccheda 53.3 ---------- With respect to the Above citations, I would now like to pose some Questions:- - Given that perception and inference are indeed fallible and prone to error, how does the Buddhist tradition establish a reliable epistemological foundation for knowledge of ultimate reality (e.g., Nirvāṇa or Sunyata)? - What is the Buddhist position on scriptural authority in general, and how is reliance on an external scripture claimed to be authorless and coming directly from God via a disciplic succession, viewed in light of Buddhist pramāṇa theories? - How would Buddhist philosophers identify the main shortcomings or philosophical weaknesses in the Vedantic insistence on Vedic knowledge as the sole valid source for understanding the Absolute? - Is there an alternative epistemic framework in Buddhism that addresses the same problem of cognitive fallibility without relying on a fixed scriptural authority?

In Buddhist epistemology, Dharmakīrti develops a sophisticated theory of perception and inference, emphasizing pramāṇa (valid cognition) as the means to apprehend reality. Central to his system is the idea that perception provides direct, non-conceptual access to particulars, while inference allows us to understand universals and causal relations. At the same time In the early Buddhist texts, the Buddha too repeatedly emphasizes “seeing things as they are” (yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti), a form of direct awareness that is often described as immediate and non-conceptual. I am interested in exploring how Dharmakīrti’s framework relates to this epistemological stance of the Buddha. To what extent can Dharmakīrti’s pramāṇic approach be interpreted as a systematic elaboration of the Buddha’s notion of direct cognition? Are there points of convergence or divergence between Dharmakīrti’s epistemic theories and the original suttas?

I’ve been reading quite a bit about both Pyrrhonism (from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Sextus Empiricus) and Madhyamaka Buddhism (especially Nāgārjuna’s teachings), and I’m curious about how deeply their approaches to knowledge, doubt, and emptiness might align. Here are some specific points I’d like clarification on: - Both traditions seem to question the possibility of arriving at certain knowledge. Do Madhyamaka philosophers use skeptical methods purely as a strategy, or do they endorse a form of suspension of belief like Pyrrhonists? - In Pyrrhonism, the goal is ataraxia (tranquility) that arises from suspending judgment. Is this comparable to the nirvana that results from realizing śūnyatā (emptiness)? - Do Madhyamakas arrive at any “ultimate” view, or is even that view deconstructed like any other? - Are there any Buddhist responses to skepticism that help clarify the boundaries between constructive doubt and nihilism? ----------

In Buddhist epistemology, valid cognition (pramāṇa) is typically defined as cognition that is non-deceptive, with direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) accepted as its principal means.However, this raises several questions about how such validity is actually determined from within the epistemic framework itself. How does Buddhism determine that a particular perception is genuinely valid rather than merely appearing so? In cases of perception, what criteria distinguish a non-deceptive perception from an illusory or mistaken one, especially given that illusion and error are also experienced directly? If validity is established by causal efficacy or successful activity, does this not risk circularity, where correctness is judged only after the fact? Similarly, in the case of inference, how is non-deceptiveness guaranteed when inferences rely on conceptual constructions and prior cognitions that may themselves be flawed? Is the criterion of non-deceptiveness purely pragmatic, or is there a more principled account of why certain cognitions are trusted as pramāṇa while others are excluded? These questions become sharper when viewed in light of classical Mīmāṃsā critiques particularly Kumārila Bhaṭṭa ’s objections in the Ślokavārttika which challenge the Buddhist appeal to Yogic perception and the authority of the Buddha’s cognition itself. Here Are some excerpts - Aphorism 2 > > *And then too, there results the absurdity of (your Scripture proving) > the authenticity of subjects other than either Duty or Non-Duty. And > so long as the Sankhya and the rest continue to exist, your instance > too is hard to be got at.* > > *Because, while being a human assertion, it refers to supersensuous > subjects ; — therefore too, on account of mutual dependence, the > Scripture of Buddha and others would come to be false.* > > *Explanation* - The assertion of Buddha with regard to the momentary > character of all external objects, has been said to conform with our > own experience, which fact has been made the ground of proving his > veracity. But the Sankhya has established, beyond the least doubt, > that all that exists is eternal, and exists for ever. Under such > circumstances, so long as you have not fully refuted the arguments of > the Sankhyas, you cannot hope to establish the authority of your > Author, on the grounds that you have urged. > > Just as human speech, when referring to transcendental objects is > almost always sure to be false, so, the speech of Buddha too could not > but be false. And when his assertions with regard to transcendental > objects come to be false, those with regard to perceptible objects too > (such as the momentary character of all objects, &c.), become false. > And as his veracity was sought by you to be proved on the ground of > his latter assertions being true, it falls to the ground unsupported. Here Kumārila argues that the Buddha’s statements are human testimony about supersensuous matters, and thus epistemically unreliable. Attempting to establish the Buddha’s authority by appealing to doctrines like momentariness results in mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya), since the doctrines are justified by the Buddha’s authority and the authority by the doctrines. Competing systems (e.g. Sāṃkhya) offer rival metaphysical claims like eternalism, preventing any unique validation of Buddhist cognition. Aphorism 5 (Niralamba vada) > *87-88. If a cognition be false, would it not be liable to rejection ? > If it were to be false even without being rejected, then there would > be no restriction (as to the reality or unreality of a cognition).* > > *88-89. For us, dream-cognition would certainly be falsified by the > perception of a waking- cognition contradicting it; while for you, > what would constitute the difference (between the reality of > waking-cognition and that of dream-consciousness, both of which are > held by you to be equally false) ?* > > *89-90. Of waking cognition as such, there is no proper (correct) > contradictory cognition, — the perception whereof would establish the > falsity of such (waking) cognitions as those of the post and the like.* > > *90-91. The fact of waking cognitions being the contradictory of dream > cognition is known to all persons, and, as such they differ from dream > cognition (which is known only to particular individuals), just like > the cognition, which serves to reject (a particular dream-cognition).* > > *91-93. Objection. : " Of such waking cognitions as those of the post, > &c., invalidating cognitions do arise in the shape of those of the > true Yogis (who know all things worldly to be false) ; and this would > certainly make these waking cognitions equal to dream-cognitions (in > point of falsity). And such invalidating cognitions too (as those of > Yogis) would belong to all living creatures when they reach the Yogic > stage ; and hence the fact of waking cognitions having invalidating > counter-cognitions becomes established."* > > *93-94. Resp:- But, such Yogic cognition is not found to belong to any > person in this life ; and as for those who have reached the Yogic > state, we know not what happens to them.* > > *94-95. Our Yogis too could have only such invalidating cognitions as > would be either subversive of or contrary to your assertion.* > > *Explanation:- If you urge the cognition of your Bauddha Yogi against > our theory, so could we also bring forward the cognitions of our own > Yogis, as invalidating your theory.* Kumārila’s point here is a symmetry objection: He posits rival schools can equally posit their own yogins whose supersensuos perceptions contradict Buddhist claims. Without an independent criterion for privileging Bauddha yogic cognition, the appeal to yogic pratyakṣa fails to establish non-deceptiveness. Given these critiques, how do Buddhist schools justify the epistemic status of valid perception and yogic cognition? Is pramāṇa self-authenticating, confirmed by later cognition, or grounded in pragmatic success? How would various schools such as Theravāda, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the Dignāga–Dharmakīrti tradition respond to the charge of circularity and symmetry raised by Kumārila?

Owen Flanagan in this podcast argued while Buddhism has an extremely well developed notion of compassion, it doesn't have a significant notion of justice. He contrasts this with ancient Greek philosophies which he states have a strong notion of justice and weak or absent notion of compassion. So is this correct? Does Buddhism really not have decent (or any) notion of justice. Can anyone perhaps provide examples of justice from the texts (Pali Canon, Mayahana etc..). Or is Owen right - no justice in Buddhism?

Please don't move this to the Philosophy stack unless absolutely necessary. My personal belief in an afterlife is based on: 1. Being indefinite about "what is now?" 2. I assume that "my death" is semantically precise in some way, it's clear what we all mean by that 3. Linking these two, in terms of the impossibility of vague identity. Some people might object to my version of time or death, so while I am more interested in understanding 'vague identity', I cannot yet get started rhetorically. What's going on here? Which of these moves are allowed in the language game?