Is soteriology possible without ontological or metaphysical commitments?

Across Buddhist traditions, liberation (nirvāṇa/nibbāna) is presented as the cessation of suffering through insight into the nature of reality. However, there appears to be substantial disagreement both within the tradition and in modern scholarship over whether this requires substantive ontological commitments. In the early discourses of the Pāli Canon, the Buddha famously refuses to answer speculative metaphysical questions (e.g., the “undeclared questions” in the Cūḷamālukya Sutta), framing the Dhamma as therapeutically oriented toward the cessation of dukkha. This has led some interpreters to read early Buddhism as anti-metaphysical or methodologically quietist. Yet the path itself seems to require insight into doctrines such as dependent origination paṭiccasamuppāda,anattā, and anicca. These appear to function not merely as pragmatic heuristics but as claims about how things actually are. Later traditions intensify this tension:- - The Abhidharma systems of schools such as the Sarvāstivāda develop highly detailed ontologies of dharmas, seemingly grounding liberation in precise metaphysical analysis. - In contrast, Madhyamaka, especially as articulated by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, appears to deconstruct all ontological positions including those that might underwrite soteriology itself while maintaining that such deconstruction is indispensable for liberation. This raises a structural problem: If liberation requires “seeing things as they are” (yathābhūta-ñāṇadassana), does this not presuppose some metaphysical or ontological account of what ultimately exists or how phenomena are structured? Can a “metaphysics-free” Buddhism be coherent, or does the very logic of liberation require at least minimal ontological commitments?