Vietnamese sentences: Thánh tăng, Thánh ni và Thánh cư sĩ còn ăn thịt chúng sinh thì Thánh đó là Thánh gì? Câu hỏi này để tự quý vị suy ngẫm trả lời. English sentences: If Noble Monks, Noble Nuns, and Noble Lay Disciples still consume the flesh of sentient beings, then what kind of Noble person is that? This question is for you yourselves to reflect on and answer. Do you think this is a good translation for our international Buddhists?

The three kinds of suffering as mentioned in SN45.165 : 1. > Suffering caused by pain 2. > suffering caused by the formations 3. > suffering due to change Does the EBT (and elsewhere) suggest, or give examples of a mixture, or juxtaposition of the three types of dukkha? Sallatha Sutta: The Arrow might fit the bill, but where else?

I’ve been reading quite a bit about both Pyrrhonism (from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Sextus Empiricus) and Madhyamaka Buddhism (especially Nāgārjuna’s teachings), and I’m curious about how deeply their approaches to knowledge, doubt, and emptiness might align. Here are some specific points I’d like clarification on: - Both traditions seem to question the possibility of arriving at certain knowledge. Do Madhyamaka philosophers use skeptical methods purely as a strategy, or do they endorse a form of suspension of belief like Pyrrhonists? - In Pyrrhonism, the goal is ataraxia (tranquility) that arises from suspending judgment. Is this comparable to the nirvana that results from realizing śūnyatā (emptiness)? - Do Madhyamakas arrive at any “ultimate” view, or is even that view deconstructed like any other? - Are there any Buddhist responses to skepticism that help clarify the boundaries between constructive doubt and nihilism? ----------

According to SN 51.10 : > So at the Cāpāla Tree-shrine the Buddha, mindful and aware, > surrendered the life force. When he did so there was a great > earthquake, awe-inspiring and hair-raising, and thunder cracked the > sky. Then, understanding this matter, on that occasion the Buddha > expressed this heartfelt sentiment: > > “Comparing the incomparable with the creation of prolonged life, the > sage surrendered the life force. Happy inside, serene, he shattered > self-creation like a suit of armor.” Why did Buddha surrender his life three months in advance, or was it a foregone conclusion? Is perfection of concentration, the four bases of psychic power , mandatory to surrender it? What is required?

The Jagannath temple of Puri currently is one of the most notable Vaishnava hindu temples, wherein the deity is worshipped as Vishnu or Krishna. Many puranic texts such as brahma purana and skanda purana too mention the site as a Vaishnavite pilgrimage. However it is worth noting that certain authorities, religious or non religious have been at many occasions been pointing out that the jagannatha temple was originally buddhist which was later hinduised and given its present form. Even Swami Vivekananda, A hindu saint admits this in one occasion. Quoting from the Complete works of Swami Vivekananda ---------- Questions - 1. Are there any ancient historical mentions, preferably in buddhist literature that assert that the site was originally a buddhist temple? 2. Are there any archaeological evidences that point out that the site was originally buddhist and was later hinduised as Swami vivekananda says?

It’s a plate from the shambhala dragon tibetan book of the dead (fremantle & trungpa, 1975). the caption says > the central figure is the supreme dharmakaya buddha and represents the dharmata. he is surrounded by the mandalas of the peaceful deities, the vidyadharas and the wrathful deities represented by their mantras could anyone help me find a legend/source for which deities are represented by which mandalas, and what deities are represented by the mantras (and also a translation of the mantras) ?

People who have done wrong to me remain in my memory and continuously stay in my mind. I have feelings of ill will and hatered towards them...to revenge...how do I get out of the feelings of ill will...

When a person or a group of people identify themselves with "the good" (in opposition to "not so good" or even "the evil" of others), quite often this can lead to "the good" getting overly aggressive in its pursuit of the goodness and de-facto turning into evil. Is this an inevitable problem arising due to identification/reification or is there a way to keep it under control and identify with the good without becoming the evil? If so, how can that be achieved? What guidelines do various Buddhist schools offer on this topic, if any? P.S. by "to identify with" I mean "to consider themselves to be affiliated with, or to be representative of, the true *something* (in this case *the good*)"

In the early Buddhist discourses, anattā is primarily taught through an analysis of the five aggregates, showing that none of them can coherently be identified as a self. At the same time, the Buddha repeatedly declines to affirm either the existence or the non-existence of a self when questioned directly. This combination of analytic negation and doctrinal restraint raises a fundamental interpretive question about the status of the teaching. Should anattā be understood only as a soteriological method aimed at dismantling identity-view and attachment, without committing to a determinate ontological claim about reality? Or does it presuppose a view about the nature of reality that is deliberately left implicit in the early texts? How should the Buddha’s refusal to answer metaphysical questions about the self be understood: as a principled suspension of ontology, or as a pedagogical strategy shaped by the goals of the path? Furthermore, Do developments in the Theravada and Madhyamaka traditions represent faithful philosophical articulations of the early teaching, or do they mark a shift in explanatory aims and conceptual framework?

My question is subtle. When we meditate we move our body because of some physical pain . My question is why its so painful to keep my mind on breath . Its not physical pain then what type of pain we face when we try to keep our mind on beath away from distraction.

In Buddhist epistemology, valid cognition (pramāṇa) is typically defined as cognition that is non-deceptive, with direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) accepted as its principal means.However, this raises several questions about how such validity is actually determined from within the epistemic framework itself. How does Buddhism determine that a particular perception is genuinely valid rather than merely appearing so? In cases of perception, what criteria distinguish a non-deceptive perception from an illusory or mistaken one, especially given that illusion and error are also experienced directly? If validity is established by causal efficacy or successful activity, does this not risk circularity, where correctness is judged only after the fact? Similarly, in the case of inference, how is non-deceptiveness guaranteed when inferences rely on conceptual constructions and prior cognitions that may themselves be flawed? Is the criterion of non-deceptiveness purely pragmatic, or is there a more principled account of why certain cognitions are trusted as pramāṇa while others are excluded? These questions become sharper when viewed in light of classical Mīmāṃsā critiques particularly Kumārila Bhaṭṭa ’s objections in the Ślokavārttika which challenge the Buddhist appeal to Yogic perception and the authority of the Buddha’s cognition itself. Here Are some excerpts - Aphorism 2 > > *And then too, there results the absurdity of (your Scripture proving) > the authenticity of subjects other than either Duty or Non-Duty. And > so long as the Sankhya and the rest continue to exist, your instance > too is hard to be got at.* > > *Because, while being a human assertion, it refers to supersensuous > subjects ; — therefore too, on account of mutual dependence, the > Scripture of Buddha and others would come to be false.* > > *Explanation* - The assertion of Buddha with regard to the momentary > character of all external objects, has been said to conform with our > own experience, which fact has been made the ground of proving his > veracity. But the Sankhya has established, beyond the least doubt, > that all that exists is eternal, and exists for ever. Under such > circumstances, so long as you have not fully refuted the arguments of > the Sankhyas, you cannot hope to establish the authority of your > Author, on the grounds that you have urged. > > Just as human speech, when referring to transcendental objects is > almost always sure to be false, so, the speech of Buddha too could not > but be false. And when his assertions with regard to transcendental > objects come to be false, those with regard to perceptible objects too > (such as the momentary character of all objects, &c.), become false. > And as his veracity was sought by you to be proved on the ground of > his latter assertions being true, it falls to the ground unsupported. Here Kumārila argues that the Buddha’s statements are human testimony about supersensuous matters, and thus epistemically unreliable. Attempting to establish the Buddha’s authority by appealing to doctrines like momentariness results in mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya), since the doctrines are justified by the Buddha’s authority and the authority by the doctrines. Competing systems (e.g. Sāṃkhya) offer rival metaphysical claims like eternalism, preventing any unique validation of Buddhist cognition. Aphorism 5 (Niralamba vada) > *87-88. If a cognition be false, would it not be liable to rejection ? > If it were to be false even without being rejected, then there would > be no restriction (as to the reality or unreality of a cognition).* > > *88-89. For us, dream-cognition would certainly be falsified by the > perception of a waking- cognition contradicting it; while for you, > what would constitute the difference (between the reality of > waking-cognition and that of dream-consciousness, both of which are > held by you to be equally false) ?* > > *89-90. Of waking cognition as such, there is no proper (correct) > contradictory cognition, — the perception whereof would establish the > falsity of such (waking) cognitions as those of the post and the like.* > > *90-91. The fact of waking cognitions being the contradictory of dream > cognition is known to all persons, and, as such they differ from dream > cognition (which is known only to particular individuals), just like > the cognition, which serves to reject (a particular dream-cognition).* > > *91-93. Objection. : " Of such waking cognitions as those of the post, > &c., invalidating cognitions do arise in the shape of those of the > true Yogis (who know all things worldly to be false) ; and this would > certainly make these waking cognitions equal to dream-cognitions (in > point of falsity). And such invalidating cognitions too (as those of > Yogis) would belong to all living creatures when they reach the Yogic > stage ; and hence the fact of waking cognitions having invalidating > counter-cognitions becomes established."* > > *93-94. Resp:- But, such Yogic cognition is not found to belong to any > person in this life ; and as for those who have reached the Yogic > state, we know not what happens to them.* > > *94-95. Our Yogis too could have only such invalidating cognitions as > would be either subversive of or contrary to your assertion.* > > *Explanation:- If you urge the cognition of your Bauddha Yogi against > our theory, so could we also bring forward the cognitions of our own > Yogis, as invalidating your theory.* Kumārila’s point here is a symmetry objection: He posits rival schools can equally posit their own yogins whose supersensuos perceptions contradict Buddhist claims. Without an independent criterion for privileging Bauddha yogic cognition, the appeal to yogic pratyakṣa fails to establish non-deceptiveness. Given these critiques, how do Buddhist schools justify the epistemic status of valid perception and yogic cognition? Is pramāṇa self-authenticating, confirmed by later cognition, or grounded in pragmatic success? How would various schools such as Theravāda, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the Dignāga–Dharmakīrti tradition respond to the charge of circularity and symmetry raised by Kumārila?

What practise to do to fill your heart with Metta? What kind of meditation or what to do the meditation?

I come from Hindu background. Hindus do idol worship in the temples and also there are idols in home. There are elaborate rituals about how to do the worship. The core belief in hindusim is that if you worship the idol then that particular diety will grant wishes, fulfill desires and give boons to fulfill the desires in samsara. Almost 90% of how hinduism is practised is along the lines of pleasing the diety. However the central tenet of Buddhism is to get rid of desires and desiring mind. "Desire is the cause of sorrow" the Buddha said. So, My question is why do Buddhist also do idol worship. There are temples of the Buddha where there are Buddha statues and also there are rituals in front of the Buddha statue. When asked 'if the Buddha exist after the Mahaparinirvana?' The Buddha did not answer the question. Nirvana means 'blown out', 'extinguished. My question is, does the Buddha help in any way to the devotees of the Buddha. Does the Buddha help solve the problems in Samsara? How does the worshipping of the Buddha help the Buddhist on the path? Is there some part of Buddha, perhaps His consciousness gets accessed through the statue?

Of the 4 brahmaviharas, karuna, metta, mudita and uppekha, which is the most easy to practise?

Strange question I know. I have recently had notice of a loved one who has died and have to go to a funeral but after decades of practising the dharma my mind is unmoved by such things, where my peers are non buddhist puthujjana so are of course going to be swept up in the usual swirl of emotions after a loved one has died. My question is, is it morally correct to fake sadness to fit in with others as how they would assume a person would/should react. As a Buddhist, its just another day in the life of samsara. Sure I have compassion for people who have lost a loved one and are feeling suffering but to me the whole deal is rather trivial. Death is just a part of the cycle. Does not help that I am from a traditional christian country, where the funeral will also be a christian service and death here is seen as an innately sad thing. It is usual for funerals to be very sombre and quite depressing.

This question came to me from over thinking the "Angulimala" story. He had to "repent" to some extent for the murders he committed, by being scolded an hit by stones. However, the effect of the karma seems to be quite mild for 999 murders and even the intention to kill the Buddha. So my question is this: Does your karma have to be neutral or positive to become enlightened? And if not, what happens to the negative karma after attaining enlightenment?

Among the many schools and traditions, what core teachings are shared by all Buddhists?

I want to cultivate the brahmavihara of Karuna (compassion). How to meditate or what practise to generate the heart of Karuna?

Pramana refers to sources of knowledge in Indian epistemology. The wikipedia article on Pramana states: > Buddhism holds two (perception, inference) are valid means ... to knowledge. This sutta supports Pratyakṣa or perception: > “And what, bhikkhus, is The All? The eye and forms, the ear and > sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and > tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called The > All. > > “If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: ‘Having rejected this all, I > shall make known another all’—that would be a mere empty boast on his > part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, > further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, > bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.” > SN 35.23 Are there examples in the suttas where the Buddha, or his Arahant teacher disciples like Sariputta, used Anumāna or inference? Please provide them. Let's say, when you wake up from sleep and go outside your house to observe the ground to be wet everywhere, but it's currently not raining. So based on this observation, you can infer that it must have very recently rained. Is there any truth of the suttas that is not observed directly by perception but rather inferred from indirect evidence? Another example is evolution. We cannot observe that humans evolved from a common ancestor with chimpanzees. However, we can infer that indirectly from fossil evidence. This is obtaining knowledge from inference. There can be other examples, like how the ancients inferred that Earth must be spherical from the way shadows fell on the ground differently in different cities at the same time.

Does choosing a timer imply that meditation has a fixed goal or endpoint, while choosing a stopwatch suggests that awareness itself sets the boundaries? If time is an illusion we impose on the eternal now, why do we measure it at all in moments of stillness? What might emerge if you meditated without any clock, letting the universe's rhythm guide you instead?