In the early Buddhist discourses, anattā is primarily taught through an analysis of the five aggregates, showing that none of them can coherently be identified as a self. At the same time, the Buddha repeatedly declines to affirm either the existence or the non-existence of a self when questioned directly. This combination of analytic negation and doctrinal restraint raises a fundamental interpretive question about the status of the teaching. Should anattā be understood only as a soteriological method aimed at dismantling identity-view and attachment, without committing to a determinate ontological claim about reality? Or does it presuppose a view about the nature of reality that is deliberately left implicit in the early texts? How should the Buddha’s refusal to answer metaphysical questions about the self be understood: as a principled suspension of ontology, or as a pedagogical strategy shaped by the goals of the path? Furthermore, Do developments in the Theravada and Madhyamaka traditions represent faithful philosophical articulations of the early teaching, or do they mark a shift in explanatory aims and conceptual framework?

My question is subtle. When we meditate we move our body because of some physical pain . My question is why its so painful to keep my mind on breath . Its not physical pain then what type of pain we face when we try to keep our mind on beath away from distraction.

In Buddhist epistemology, valid cognition (pramāṇa) is typically defined as cognition that is non-deceptive, with direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) accepted as its principal means.However, this raises several questions about how such validity is actually determined from within the epistemic framework itself. How does Buddhism determine that a particular perception is genuinely valid rather than merely appearing so? In cases of perception, what criteria distinguish a non-deceptive perception from an illusory or mistaken one, especially given that illusion and error are also experienced directly? If validity is established by causal efficacy or successful activity, does this not risk circularity, where correctness is judged only after the fact? Similarly, in the case of inference, how is non-deceptiveness guaranteed when inferences rely on conceptual constructions and prior cognitions that may themselves be flawed? Is the criterion of non-deceptiveness purely pragmatic, or is there a more principled account of why certain cognitions are trusted as pramāṇa while others are excluded? These questions become sharper when viewed in light of classical Mīmāṃsā critiques particularly Kumārila Bhaṭṭa ’s objections in the Ślokavārttika which challenge the Buddhist appeal to Yogic perception and the authority of the Buddha’s cognition itself. Here Are some excerpts - Aphorism 2 > > *And then too, there results the absurdity of (your Scripture proving) > the authenticity of subjects other than either Duty or Non-Duty. And > so long as the Sankhya and the rest continue to exist, your instance > too is hard to be got at.* > > *Because, while being a human assertion, it refers to supersensuous > subjects ; — therefore too, on account of mutual dependence, the > Scripture of Buddha and others would come to be false.* > > *Explanation* - The assertion of Buddha with regard to the momentary > character of all external objects, has been said to conform with our > own experience, which fact has been made the ground of proving his > veracity. But the Sankhya has established, beyond the least doubt, > that all that exists is eternal, and exists for ever. Under such > circumstances, so long as you have not fully refuted the arguments of > the Sankhyas, you cannot hope to establish the authority of your > Author, on the grounds that you have urged. > > Just as human speech, when referring to transcendental objects is > almost always sure to be false, so, the speech of Buddha too could not > but be false. And when his assertions with regard to transcendental > objects come to be false, those with regard to perceptible objects too > (such as the momentary character of all objects, &c.), become false. > And as his veracity was sought by you to be proved on the ground of > his latter assertions being true, it falls to the ground unsupported. Here Kumārila argues that the Buddha’s statements are human testimony about supersensuous matters, and thus epistemically unreliable. Attempting to establish the Buddha’s authority by appealing to doctrines like momentariness results in mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya), since the doctrines are justified by the Buddha’s authority and the authority by the doctrines. Competing systems (e.g. Sāṃkhya) offer rival metaphysical claims like eternalism, preventing any unique validation of Buddhist cognition. Aphorism 5 (Niralamba vada) > *87-88. If a cognition be false, would it not be liable to rejection ? > If it were to be false even without being rejected, then there would > be no restriction (as to the reality or unreality of a cognition).* > > *88-89. For us, dream-cognition would certainly be falsified by the > perception of a waking- cognition contradicting it; while for you, > what would constitute the difference (between the reality of > waking-cognition and that of dream-consciousness, both of which are > held by you to be equally false) ?* > > *89-90. Of waking cognition as such, there is no proper (correct) > contradictory cognition, — the perception whereof would establish the > falsity of such (waking) cognitions as those of the post and the like.* > > *90-91. The fact of waking cognitions being the contradictory of dream > cognition is known to all persons, and, as such they differ from dream > cognition (which is known only to particular individuals), just like > the cognition, which serves to reject (a particular dream-cognition).* > > *91-93. Objection. : " Of such waking cognitions as those of the post, > &c., invalidating cognitions do arise in the shape of those of the > true Yogis (who know all things worldly to be false) ; and this would > certainly make these waking cognitions equal to dream-cognitions (in > point of falsity). And such invalidating cognitions too (as those of > Yogis) would belong to all living creatures when they reach the Yogic > stage ; and hence the fact of waking cognitions having invalidating > counter-cognitions becomes established."* > > *93-94. Resp:- But, such Yogic cognition is not found to belong to any > person in this life ; and as for those who have reached the Yogic > state, we know not what happens to them.* > > *94-95. Our Yogis too could have only such invalidating cognitions as > would be either subversive of or contrary to your assertion.* > > *Explanation:- If you urge the cognition of your Bauddha Yogi against > our theory, so could we also bring forward the cognitions of our own > Yogis, as invalidating your theory.* Kumārila’s point here is a symmetry objection: He posits rival schools can equally posit their own yogins whose supersensuos perceptions contradict Buddhist claims. Without an independent criterion for privileging Bauddha yogic cognition, the appeal to yogic pratyakṣa fails to establish non-deceptiveness. Given these critiques, how do Buddhist schools justify the epistemic status of valid perception and yogic cognition? Is pramāṇa self-authenticating, confirmed by later cognition, or grounded in pragmatic success? How would various schools such as Theravāda, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the Dignāga–Dharmakīrti tradition respond to the charge of circularity and symmetry raised by Kumārila?

What practise to do to fill your heart with Metta? What kind of meditation or what to do the meditation?

I come from Hindu background. Hindus do idol worship in the temples and also there are idols in home. There are elaborate rituals about how to do the worship. The core belief in hindusim is that if you worship the idol then that particular diety will grant wishes, fulfill desires and give boons to fulfill the desires in samsara. Almost 90% of how hinduism is practised is along the lines of pleasing the diety. However the central tenet of Buddhism is to get rid of desires and desiring mind. "Desire is the cause of sorrow" the Buddha said. So, My question is why do Buddhist also do idol worship. There are temples of the Buddha where there are Buddha statues and also there are rituals in front of the Buddha statue. When asked 'if the Buddha exist after the Mahaparinirvana?' The Buddha did not answer the question. Nirvana means 'blown out', 'extinguished. My question is, does the Buddha help in any way to the devotees of the Buddha. Does the Buddha help solve the problems in Samsara? How does the worshipping of the Buddha help the Buddhist on the path? Is there some part of Buddha, perhaps His consciousness gets accessed through the statue?

Of the 4 brahmaviharas, karuna, metta, mudita and uppekha, which is the most easy to practise?

Strange question I know. I have recently had notice of a loved one who has died and have to go to a funeral but after decades of practising the dharma my mind is unmoved by such things, where my peers are non buddhist puthujjana so are of course going to be swept up in the usual swirl of emotions after a loved one has died. My question is, is it morally correct to fake sadness to fit in with others as how they would assume a person would/should react. As a Buddhist, its just another day in the life of samsara. Sure I have compassion for people who have lost a loved one and are feeling suffering but to me the whole deal is rather trivial. Death is just a part of the cycle. Does not help that I am from a traditional christian country, where the funeral will also be a christian service and death here is seen as an innately sad thing. It is usual for funerals to be very sombre and quite depressing.

This question came to me from over thinking the "Angulimala" story. He had to "repent" to some extent for the murders he committed, by being scolded an hit by stones. However, the effect of the karma seems to be quite mild for 999 murders and even the intention to kill the Buddha. So my question is this: Does your karma have to be neutral or positive to become enlightened? And if not, what happens to the negative karma after attaining enlightenment?

Among the many schools and traditions, what core teachings are shared by all Buddhists?

I want to cultivate the brahmavihara of Karuna (compassion). How to meditate or what practise to generate the heart of Karuna?

Pramana refers to sources of knowledge in Indian epistemology. The wikipedia article on Pramana states: > Buddhism holds two (perception, inference) are valid means ... to knowledge. This sutta supports Pratyakṣa or perception: > “And what, bhikkhus, is The All? The eye and forms, the ear and > sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and > tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called The > All. > > “If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: ‘Having rejected this all, I > shall make known another all’—that would be a mere empty boast on his > part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, > further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, > bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.” > SN 35.23 Are there examples in the suttas where the Buddha, or his Arahant teacher disciples like Sariputta, used Anumāna or inference? Please provide them. Let's say, when you wake up from sleep and go outside your house to observe the ground to be wet everywhere, but it's currently not raining. So based on this observation, you can infer that it must have very recently rained. Is there any truth of the suttas that is not observed directly by perception but rather inferred from indirect evidence? Another example is evolution. We cannot observe that humans evolved from a common ancestor with chimpanzees. However, we can infer that indirectly from fossil evidence. This is obtaining knowledge from inference. There can be other examples, like how the ancients inferred that Earth must be spherical from the way shadows fell on the ground differently in different cities at the same time.

Does choosing a timer imply that meditation has a fixed goal or endpoint, while choosing a stopwatch suggests that awareness itself sets the boundaries? If time is an illusion we impose on the eternal now, why do we measure it at all in moments of stillness? What might emerge if you meditated without any clock, letting the universe's rhythm guide you instead?

Anatta is often described as "not-self" which I understand to mean that our identities are illusions. But it's also described as "soullessness" which I think implies that there is no mind other than the brain itself. But many Buddhists believe in rebirth. If there is no soul, how can there be rebirth?

It seems while cetanā concerns having a goal, vāyāma is what carries this goal out. My understanding is neither vāyāma nor cetanā *should* involve upādāna; however, vāyāma is outside of and cultivates the ālaya. If any of this is wrong feedback would be welcome, but my question is does sati require vāyāma, or can it be the result of bountiful ālaya? Does sammā-vāyāma become less significant with cultivation?

[Sense consciousness and pure consciousness | Ajahn Sumedho | 21.10.2020](https://youtu.be/lNZV6z0UO3g?si=4jzUizukuHSJpp0m) My understanding of Sense Consciousness becomes clearer after listening to this Dhamma talk by Ajahn Sumedho. As a meditator this is very helpful. Just pure awareness without judgment and grasping. I would like to hear comments from other meditators.

What would the Buddha teach about how to respond if a dog starts hanging around your meditation hut (or wherever), initially seems friendly, but later—without warning—gets into aggressive moods and bites you severely enough that you need stitches?

Both Theravāda and Mahāyāna accept a core early Buddhist canon, yet each tradition also relies on additional bodies of literature Theravāda on the commentaries (Aṭṭhakathā, Ṭīkā, and post-canonical works such as the Visuddhimagga) and Mahāyāna on sūtras not preserved in Pāli and often considered “later” by modern scholarship. On what doctrinal or hermeneutical grounds does each tradition justify the authority of its later textual strata? Are there explicit criteria within each tradition for discerning which later works are authoritative, semi-authoritative, or merely scholastic? How do traditional scholars within each school respond to the charge that the later texts introduce ideas not present in the early Nikāyas/Āgamas?

Buddhist ethics centrally upholds the precept against taking life, But in modern society there are many professions such as soldiers, military commanders, police officers, and judges whose duties may involve lethal force whether directly (combat, armed enforcement) or indirectly (authorizing executions, issuing orders with foreseeable deadly outcomes). From a Buddhist perspective, how should we understand the karmic implications for individuals in such roles? According to canonical or commentarial sources, how is killing performed under state mandate classified in terms of akusala-kamma? Is it treated identically to private intentional killing, or do texts differentiate between personal motive and institutional role? How does the primacy of cetanā (intention) apply when one participates in lethal actions not out of personal malice but as part of an institutional duty? Furthermore Is there doctrinal room for someone to maintain sincere Buddhist practice while performing duties like the above that may involve lethal force?

I'm interested to know the academic consensus on Cleary's translation of The Blue Cliff Record. I've heard that his translations could be spotty at times, given that, how accurately has he depicted this text? To clarify: I want to know how closely Cleary's translation adheres to the original Blue Cliff Record, not how the Buddhist community regards it in terms of Buddhist practice.

In meditation practice how to recognise a faith follower, dhamma follower and sothapana?when fetter of personality view is broken whether there is a different ofstream of thoughts?