In Je Tsongkhapa's, Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path Volume 3 pages 343-344 we have this: > Therefore, as I explained before, the sword of reasoning cuts through > phenomena, revealing that they lack even a shred of the two selves, > and brings forth certainty about selflessness. So if a thing possessed > of the two selves does not exist, then how could the non- existence > which is its negation be established in reality? The con- ception that > the nonexistence that is the absence of the son of a barren woman > really exists must be based on the observation of a barren woman and > her son. If those two are never observed, then no one thinks to > construct the expression, “The nonexistence of the son of a barren > woman truly exists.” In the same way, when you see no truly existent > thing anywhere at all, you also do not give rise to the conception > that the nonexistence of that truly existent thing is something truly > existent. Therefore, you stop *all* thoughts conceiving of signs, > because if a thought conceives of true existence, it must be a thought > that conceives of the true existence of either an existent or a > nonexistent. So if the larger category is negated, then the > subcategory is negated. This is what KamalaŸıla’s *Stages of Meditation* > says. The context of this passage is a debate on how to generate the direct perception of emptiness. To my understanding, Je Tsongkhapa is refuting the notion that the Path of Seeing can be attained by eliminating all conceptual thought after one has used reason (ie., conceptual thought) to thoroughly conceive of the truth of emptiness. The above passage to me seems to be saying that we have to use analysis/reason/conceptual thought during meditation to establish that, "the nonexistence that is the absence of the son of a barren woman really exists." In other words, that emptiness (the nonexistence or negation of the existence of the son of a barren woman) truly exists is the conclusion of analysis directed at the ultimate. Is this so? However, right after that it says to enter into signlessness you have to stop *all* thoughts (emphasis in the original) of true existence ie., even the true existence of emptiness. I'm confused. Is emptiness a true existent (ie., not mistaken with regards to its appearing object)? I think it is. However, in order to enter signlessness do we have to stop thinking this? What is the correct interpretation of this passage? I *think* Je Tsongkhapa must be using "true existence" or "real" existence synonymously here with inherent existence rather than the alternative defintion of, "non-mistaken with regard to its appearing object." Why? In the very next passage he says this: > Thus, to achieve the nonconceptual sublime wisdom, you alter- nate (1) > **developing certainty, profound certainty, that there is not even a > particle of true existence in any thing or non-thing whatso- ever**, and > (2) stabilizing your mind on the conclusion thereby reached. You > cannot achieve such wisdom by simply constricting mental activity > without any analysis of an object, because this ap- proach does not > make it possible to eliminate the conception of true existence. This > is because it is merely not thinking of true existence; it is not > knowledge of the absence of true existence. In the same way, it is > merely not thinking of a self, but is not knowledge of the lack of > self, so cultivating it does not stop the conception of self. There- > fore, you must distinguish between (1) not thinking about true exist- > ence or the existence of the two selves, and (2) knowing the lack of > true existence or the nonexistence of the two selves. Remember this > critical point. Thus, I think he must be using 'true existence' synonymously with inherent existence.

Does modern Theravada accept that no real person ends with the break up of the body of a realized one? That the moment after the break up of the body of a realized one is the same as the moment before? In SN 22.85 With Yamaka (sujato) and alternative translation Sariputta seems to rebut the notion that any substantial change happens during the break up of the body of a realized one: > Now at that time a mendicant called Yamaka had the following harmful > misconception: “As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who > has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body > breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.” > > Several mendicants heard about this. They went to Yamaka and exchanged > greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were > over, they sat down to one side and said to him: > > “Is it really true, Reverend Yamaka, that you have such a harmful > misconception: ‘As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who > has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body > breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’” “Yes, reverends, that’s > how I understand the Buddha’s teaching.” > > “Don’t say that, Yamaka! Don’t misrepresent the Buddha, for > misrepresentation of the Buddha is not good. And the Buddha would not > say that.” But even though admonished by those mendicants, Yamaka > obstinately held on to that misconception and insisted on stating it. After talking with Sariputta it seems Yamaka has a change of heart after this question by Sariputta: > “What do you think, Yamaka? Do you regard the Realized One as one who > is without form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness?” > “No, reverend.” “In that case, Reverend Yamaka, **since you don’t > acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact in the present life**, is > it appropriate to declare: ‘As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a > mendicant who has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed > when their body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’?” > Here is the same portion in Venerable Bodhi's translation: > “But, friend, **when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real > and actual here in this very life**, is it fitting for you to declare: > ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose > taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of > the body and does not exist after death’?” So does this mean the break up of the body is just like any moment in this very life where moment to moment no person truly ends or changes because a real person doesn't truly exist in the first place? EDIT: I'm aware that orthodox Theravada tenet systems posit the selflessness of persons, but are either agnostic or outright reject the selflessness of phenomena. However, most pali canon suttas seem to stop at the coarse level of selflessness, but here Sariputta seems to be speaking about the subtler levels of the selflessness of persons if only in embryonic form. Is this true? Also, if the body of a person is regarded as a real substantial thing in Theravada how about the consciousness of a person? Is that regarded as a real substantial thing?

According to the Yamaka Sutta quoted below, a run-of-the-mill person thinks one of the following: - the form to be the self - the self as possessing form - the form as in the self - the self as in form And the same applies to the other aggregates. If someone says with identity view, that "I am a professor", "I am an American", "I am successful" etc., what would this case be? Is "professor" a mental fabrication? So, "I am a professor" (with identity view) would be the case of assuming a mental fabrication to be the self? From the Yamaka Sutta (SN 22.85) : > "In the same way, an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person — who has no > regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their > Dhamma; who has no regard for men of integrity, is not well-versed or > disciplined in their Dhamma — assumes form (the body) to be the self, > or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as > in form. > > "He assumes feeling to be the self... > > "He assumes perception to be the self... > > "He assumes (mental) fabrications to be the self... > > "He assumes consciousness to be the self, or the self as possessing > consciousness, or consciousness as in the self, or the self as in > consciousness.

In what Pali sutta[s] does the Buddha says something approximately like, > Everyone needs someone better than them, who they can revere and who can guide them: who will be their teacher. But there is no-one better than the Buddha: and so I take the Dhamma as my guide/superior/teacher.

I think both substrate and rigpa are not a state - they pervade into states. Substrate consciousness pervades on waking state and dreaming state - so in the substrate consciousness we can have lucid dream, where we are aware that we are dreaming (or substrate consciousness is aware that we are dreaming). Rigpa pervades sleep state (without dream) as well as waking state and dreaming state - so rigpa can be aware of rigpa when we are in deep sleep. In other words, something is awake when we are in deep sleep because rigpa is aware of rigpa. Is my understanding correct? --- I need to elaborate my questions. Rigpa is different from what is achieved from Zen or other non-dual traditions such as Vedanta or Shavism, and Rigpa can be achieved when we go one step further from being aware of being aware. In Vedanta, Turiya can be recognized when being aware of being aware, and something(not a state) pervaded into wake, dream and deep sleep state, so in Turiya we can dream with recognizing the dream(lucid dream), when we are fully settled in Turiya. But "when we go one step further," only thing I can presume is that something can be recognized when being in deep sleep. So it could be called Rigpa, as Rigpa is aware of Rigpa when in deep sleep. What I am trying to say is not criticizing his teaching; I respect his teachings. Also the explanation on Vedanta is just reference to describe the question, mostly coming from Ken Wilber's book - Vedanta is not the topic here. I just want to clarify my understanding on the teaching and what Rigpa is. Please help me to understand.

After years of abandoning Buddhism and becoming an agnostic, I somehow finally experienced/felt the Four Noble Truths yesterday, or at least the truth of the first three. Then the same thing happened with anatta. What followed was mostly a relief. Then a sense of calmness, concentration, clarity and energy. But there was an ego struggle. I was scared, that I am giving up, who I am. That I won't care so deeply about things, that used to matter to me anymore. Right now I can kind of feel this... f.e. when I am listening to the music right now, I no longer consider it a part of my identity, nor do I connect so deeply with it in a sense, that its sadness nor joy resonate with my ego. The thing is, I liked being attached to it, I used to be an obsessive person - hobbies, people, music, ideas, beauty, art... Everything. Today, I feel basically the same way, both a relief and a little fear, even though my ego fear is weaker. So, I suppose, this is not a 100% realization of anatta. Is it possible to go fully back to my old attachments? :D Or is it possible to live somewhere in between? Btw, yesterday it also occured to me, that samsara and bhavacakra are just metaphors for person's psychological development both throughout life and day... Similar with karma. (I remain agnostic regarding taking them literally. Just like with anything else, like God.). I somehow feel like I will still be me. But without attaching to everything including my identity. Does that make sense? It is also radically different from a discomfort of depersonalisation, that I had a chance to briefly experience in my life. Still a little scared though. Thanks for reading this.

From my understanding of awakening (and also according to answers here like Is it possible to become UNenlightened? ), it is an irreversible process. It makes sense in theory as, once one awakens, realises the way out of all the dukkha, it's such a wonderful state. Why would one replace it with anything else? It is told that Great Zen Master Seung Sahn has reached awakening in 1949 . However, later on in life, Master Sahn has had sexual relationships with students , which he publicly admitted and did two repentance ceremonies. Even though it seems that the affairs had not been hurtful to the students, the first thing which comes to my mind is: in order to engage in sexual relationship, one must have some lust - some unsatisfactoriness or dukkha - which contradicts the state of nibbana. Does anyone have any thoughts on this matter? Some of possible explanations that I can think of: 1. Is it possible that engaging in sexual relationships was what the situation requested, that it was right-action? After all, precepts are guidelines and, if situation requires so, they are ought to be broken. If so, why did Mater Sahn do repentance ceremonies? Was it also right-action? 2. Perhaps different buddhist traditions lead to different state of nibbana. I am relatively new to buddhism and all the traditions so I don't quite understand if this is even possible? (though I doubt it) 3. It is possible to become "un-awaken" after all?

How do I describe this? > It is the formulation of a conception of an idea about a particular object of experience. What I am wondering is what the difference is between the above and: > It is the formulation of an idea about a particular object of experience.

If you have doubts on whether your practice (i.e. of the Eightfold Path) will free anyone from saṁsāra in your lifetime, then what reasons can you give for why your practice should take precedence over anything else, namely, alleviating the suffering of others in whatever mundane way you can (even if it does not free anyone from saṁsāra, (e.g. ordinary acts of charity, career in public service, etc.))?

How can the Zen school of thought distinguished from the Chan school of thought? Both spring from Mahayana, true; but what are the basic differences?

Suppose a person does certain acts that are not in line with the precepts but he does not feel remorse because it seems to the person as an trifling act, for example taking something from his/her parents without their consent or gossiping and lying (as skillful means for example). What is the Buddhist answer to that? As I know, regarding lying and gossiping for example, it is quite clear that one shouldn't do it regardless of an alleged benefit.

The Buddha always held that he was a simple man, one among us, not a God. In fact, Buddhism is principally an agnostic philosophy. Then why does Mahayana Buddhism practice the worship of the Buddha?

In this question it was said that Buddha said "I, the unexcelled teacher. I, alone, am rightly self-awakened ... I am a conqueror (of evil qualities)." The answer seems to be that Buddha used 'I' for sake of convention. Given Anatta , is the following talk a mere convention? I have craving for music. Do you have craving for ice-cream? Is the 'I'and 'you' used in the talk above merely a convention or is it real?

I didn't use to have much boys as friends but with time I made several boy friends from which some were really close. I want to know what has Lord Buddha chanted about a girl & a boy being friends? Will it be something bad when I get married?

If the mind experiences more and more happiness, calmness and all the other positive emotions due to virtue and meditation, does the mind then by itself slowly (!) withdraw from sensual pleasures? Answers with sutta reference are preferred

We experience birth , death , cravings , feelings, contact etc.. We also 'experience' ignorance(like self). We also experience choices. We can experience the whole existence as a human or a dog or as a insect. But we do not find origination of experience in dependent origination. My question is : Is experience dependently originated ? If yes then at what stage in dependent origination ?

I wonder what critique other self-identified Secular Buddhists on this forum would have of this new interview with self-proclaimed Secular Buddhist author Robert Wright. 1. What are the specific doctrines that are discarded as "supernatural?" Now, for some questions for non self-identified Secular Buddhists: 2. Any sutra references or teachings for the "cognitive bias that fascinates me" part where he talks about the "fundamental attribution error?" 3. Towards the end of the interview the interlocutors discuss what Buddhism has to say about Tribalism/Racism. Is Buddhism a prescription for overcoming Tribalism/Racism as they say? Cheers!

I am looking for the suttas where the Buddha has preached about the 5 precepts. Also how it can lead you to Samadhi, Niravana and etc. -Metta

I don't want to harbor ill-will anymore and I want to forgive others for what they did to me and also forgive myself for my past actions. So I remain aware and mindful of the thoughts of ill-will that pop up and mindful of corresponding feelings. But this does not seem to alleviate the stream of thoughts and feelings all day. How can mindfulness be employed effectively for forgiveness?

In this question , the OP asked: > In the context of the four stages of enlightenment would it be right > to say that, without identity-view, there's no such thing as an > "enlightened person": instead there are maybe "enlightened moments" or > moments of enlightenment? The Buddha in the MN 26 quote below, declared "*I, the unexcelled teacher. I, alone, am rightly self-awakened ... I am a conqueror (of evil qualities).*" However, as the enlightened one, we can be sure that the Buddha did not have identity view (sakkāya-diṭṭhi) and also did not have conceit (māna). So, how could a declaration like "*I am the unexcelled teacher*" or "*ahaṃ satthā anuttaro*" be made without identity view and without conceit? Could it be possible that it is OK to use personal pronouns and also stating truthful facts relating to one's person, without identity view and without conceit? How? In MN 26 : > "Then, having stayed at Uruvela as long as I liked, I set out to > wander by stages to Varanasi. Upaka the Ajivaka saw me on the road > between Gaya and the (place of) Awakening, and on seeing me said to > me, 'Clear, my friend, are your faculties. Pure your complexion, and > bright. On whose account have you gone forth? Who is your teacher? In > whose Dhamma do you delight?' > > "When this was said, I replied to Upaka the Ajivaka in verses: > > > All-vanquishing, > > all-knowing am I, > > with regard to all things, unadhering. > > All-abandoning, > > released in the ending of craving: > > having fully known on my own, > > to whom should I point as my teacher? > > > > I have no teacher, > > and one like me can't be found. > > In the world with its devas, > > I have no counterpart. > > > > For I am an arahant in the world; > > I, the unexcelled teacher. > > I, alone, am rightly self-awakened. > > Cooled am I, unbound. > > > > To set rolling the wheel of Dhamma > > I go to the city of Kasi. > > In a world become blind, > > I beat the drum of the Deathless.' > > "'From your claims, my friend, you must be an infinite conqueror.' > > > Conquerors are those like me > > who have reached fermentations' end. > > I've conquered evil qualities, > > and so, Upaka, I'm a conqueror.' > > "When this was said, Upaka said, 'May it be so, my friend,' and — > shaking his head, taking a side-road — he left.