By noticing my abdomen while breathing , I can feel up and down movement of it . Also I can keep a mental notes as "up" and "down". When it is up there is "rupa of up" and "Nama of up mental note " and vice versa for down. But when it is down both "up rupa and Nama " already gone . So I have a glimpse of " anicca" . I do not feel directly "dukka" relate to abdomen movement but by applying same "anicca" for other temporary things in life I can get an understanding about "dukka" too . But I do not still have any clue about "anatta" , how can I understand the "anatta" using above scenario?

An important compendium of the ancient Indian philosophical schools - called Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha - was written in India in 14th century CE by Madhvacharya (a non-Buddhist Indian Philosopher) who gives an intriguing account of the debate between ancient Indian materialists (the Charvaka) and the extent Buddhist schools of thought in India at that time. He describes the Charvaka thus: > Chárváka, the crest-gem of the **atheistical school**, the follower of the > doctrine of Bṛihaspati. The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be > eradicated, for **the majority of living beings hold by the current > refrain**— > > While life is yours, live joyously; > None can escape Death's searching eye: > When once this frame of ours they burn, > How shall it e'er again return? > > The mass of men, in accordance with the Śástras of policy and > enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, **and > denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world**, are > found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for > that school is Lokáyata,—a name well accordant with the thing > signified. This characterization would appear quite in accordance with descriptions in sutta of the Charvaka school and its tenets: > "When this was said, Ajita Kesakambalin said to me, 'Great king, there > is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed. There is no > fruit or result of good or bad actions. There is no this world, no > next world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously reborn beings; no > brahmans or contemplatives who, faring rightly and practicing rightly, > proclaim this world and the next after having directly known and > realized it for themselves. A person is a composite of four primary > elements. At death, the earth (in the body) returns to and merges with > the (external) earth-substance. The fire returns to and merges with > the external fire-substance. The liquid returns to and merges with the > external liquid-substance. The wind returns to and merges with the > external wind-substance. The sense-faculties scatter into space. Four > men, with the bier as the fifth, carry the corpse. Its eulogies are > sounded only as far as the charnel ground. The bones turn > pigeon-colored. The offerings end in ashes. Generosity is taught by > idiots. **The words of those who speak of existence after death are > false, empty chatter. With the break-up of the body, the wise and the > foolish alike are annihilated, destroyed. They do not exist after > death.**' ---------- This compendium describes the Buddhist response to the Charvaka school as a direct attack on their understanding of causation vs correlation. Succinctly put, it would appear the Charvaka did not believe in causation, but rather only believed in correlation: > "Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if > inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force; > else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the > thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on > hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do > those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?" > > All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy. > ... > **Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a > proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference**, &c. > > The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the > knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a > former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases > this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the > coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, > drugs, &c. > > From this it follows that fate, &c., do not exist, since these can > only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do > not allow adṛishṭa, the various phenomena of the world become > destitute of any cause. > > But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena > can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. > Thus it has been said— > > The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn; > By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born. > The author of the work then gives the known Buddhist reply at the time in ancient India. This can be succinctly summarized as denial of causation leads to practical absurdities. NOTE: invariable concomitance is a term of art in ancient Indian debate that is described here. > At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid > down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance, > your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is > easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has > accordingly been said— > > "From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as a > determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance—not through the > mere observation of the desired result in similar cases, nor through > the non-observation of it in dissimilar cases." > > On the hypothesis (of the Naiyáyikas) that it is concomitance and > non-concomitance (e.g., A is where B is, A is not where B is not) that > determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance of > the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being > impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and > future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyáyika) rejoin that > uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our > system, we reply: **Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect > may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a > stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be > entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in > practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt > terminates where there is a practical absurdity.**" Which seems in accordance with the ancient Indian Nagarjuna's opening verse of his famous treatise: ---------- Based on this my questions are: 1. Does the non-Buddhist author of this work accurately describe Charvaka views and tenets at the time? 2. Does the non-Buddhist author of this work accurately describe Buddhist replies at the time? 3. Why was it deemed important to the ancient Indian schools (Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike) this debate over causation vs correlation? 4. If you accept the Buddhist view in this debate as superior, then how does it undermine the views and tenets of the Charvaka? 5. Is it true that the Charvaka school was the most popular in ancient India at the time this compendium was written? 6. What do we know of how prevalent was the Charvaka school in the time of the Buddha? 7. If the Charvaka school was very prevalent in the time of the Buddha and granting the supposition that some hold - that the Buddha only taught rebirth as a fictional contrivance to appeal to the people of his time and age - then why did the Buddha also teach rebirth to the people who steadfastly rejected it? (please only answer this if you actually believe this supposition as that's all I'm interested in...)

Can anyone share or tell: where can I find a summary explaining those ancient Indian philosophies of those non-Buddhist schools that had debated with Buddhist, especially Nalanda, masters? For example, those philosophies of those opponents in Indian Buddhism Śāstras (i.e. treaties). I ask because I am studying some texts on and also pondering on the tenets system/theory of Indian Buddhism, and I would like to be rigorous in understanding what non-Buddhist philosophies are refuted grounding in reasoning by Indian Buddhism (Nalanda) masters.

A little [tag:reference-request] question. As I remember it it's the story of someone who supported his aged parents. He did this by taking loose river clay -- without digging it -- making it into pots, and leaving the pots, without setting a price. People would take the pots and leave in exchange whatever they chose to, and thus he supported his parents. This was portrayed as praise-worthy, ethical. It's perhaps not a sutta but, I don't know, perhaps one of the stories from the Dhammapada or something like that. Or possibly it's later but I thought it was from the Pali canon.

From sutta SA 2.218: > The renunciant Gotama is staying at Sāvatthī at the Jeta Grove in the > Anāthapiṇḍika Park. And there is the **nun Selā** who took her robes and > her begging bowl and entered Sāvatthī to beg for food. Having finished > her meal, she cleaned her bowl, gathered her seat and has gone to the > Andhavana forest. I shall disturb her!” Having thought this he changed > into a young man, approached her and spoke a verse: > > “Who is it that created beings, > by whom were they made? > Why are they called beings, > from where do they arise?” > > That time the **nun Selā**, having heard the verse thought: “Who is this? > What a cheat! Is he a human or a non-human being?” She entered > concentration and recognized he was King Māra. She answered with a > verse: > > “Māra, you have a wrong view of ‘beings’, > saying and believing they actually exist as substantial entities. > Conventional, empty they are but compounded entities > there are in fact no ‘beings.’ > Like when causes and various conditions > converge and yield the use of a ‘chariot’. > From sutta SN 5.10: > Then Māra the Wicked, wanting to make the **nun Vajirā** feel fear, > terror, and goosebumps, wanting to make her fall away from immersion, > went up to her and addressed her in verse: > > “Who created this sentient being? > Where is its maker? > Where has the being arisen? > And where does it cease?” > > Then the nun **Vajirā** thought, “Who’s speaking this verse, a human or a > non-human?” > > Then she thought, “This is Māra the Wicked, wanting to make me feel > fear, terror, and goosebumps, wanting to make me fall away from > immersion!” > > Then **Vajirā**, knowing that this was Māra the Wicked, replied to him in > verse: > > “Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘sentient being’? > Māra, is this your theory? > This is just a pile of conditions, > you won’t find a sentient being here. > > When the parts are assembled > we use the word ‘chariot’. > So too, when the aggregates are present > ‘sentient being’ is the convention we use. And from Mil 3.1.1: > Very good! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of “chariot.” > And just even so it is on account of all those things you questioned > me about— The thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a human body, and > the five constituent elements of being—that I come under the generally > understood term, the designation in common use, of “Nāgasena.” For it > was said, Sire, by our **Sister Vajirā** in the presence of the Blessed > One: > > “Just as it is by the condition precedent > Of the co-existence of its various parts > That the word ‘chariot’ is used, > Just so is it that when the Skandhas > Are there we talk of a ‘being.’” > > Most wonderful, Nāgasena, and most strange. Well has the puzzle put > to you, most difficult though it was, been solved. Were the Buddha > himself here he would approve your answer. Well done, well done, > Nāgasena! ---------- Are these verses about the same nun? Is there anything more known about her?

Regarding the teachings on virtue, not considering the more advanced teachings (such as Dependent Origination), did the Buddha ever speak of where the sphere of personal responsibility ends? The Buddha [seems to be clear](https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/AN/AN6_63.html) that what determines the moral quality of one's volitional actions is the intention behind them. But other times, such as when [discussing wrong livelihood](https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/AN/AN5_177.html) , it seems that one is responsible for second-order effects as well (e.g. the harm that might result from the weapons that one has sold). So is there something exceptional to trading in weapons to qualify it as wrong livelihood? Or is there more nuance to the teachings of virtue, and one is responsible for some second-order effects as well? If the latter is true, then in which cases is one responsible? Are there any Suttas I can read about this? Thank you, and Metta.

It is commonly asserted that Buddhism advocates for monasticism as an ethical ideal for at least some of humanity. I am interested not in arguments for monasticism full stop, but arguments from a Buddhist perspective that are counter to arguments against monasticism as such. Does such a thing exist? I realize that there will be fuzzy line between these two domains, so sources that touch on both are acceptable to me.

In SN 35.145 (below), we see that the body, intellect etc. is "old karma", capable to be felt. But it doesn't say whose "old karma" it is. The sutta also talks about "new karma" generated by decisions and actions within our control, but also not pinned to a specific individual self identity. Also SN 12.37 reiterates this. > "Now what, monks, is old kamma? The eye is to be seen as old kamma, > fabricated & willed, capable of being felt. The ear... The nose... The > tongue... The body... The intellect is to be seen as old kamma, > fabricated & willed, capable of being felt. This is called old kamma. The following comes from SN 12.17 (although this quote comes from here ). Here, karma is not pinned to a specific self identity or a specific individual. Karma is attributed to past decisions and actions, coming from dependently originated conditions. > Again, when the Buddha was asked by the naked ascetic Kassapa whether > suffering was of one's own making or of another's or both or neither, > the Buddha replied "Do not put it like that." When asked whether there > was no suffering or whether the Buddha neither knew nor saw it, the > Buddha replied that there was, and that he both knew and saw it. He > then said "Kassapa, if one asserts that 'He who makes (it) feels (it): > being one existent from the beginning, his suffering is of his own > making,' then one arrives at eternalism. But if one asserts that one > makes (it), another feels (it); being one existent crushed out by > feeling, his suffering is of another's making,' then one arrives at > annihilationism. Instead of resorting to either extreme a Tathaagata > teaches the Dhamma by the middle way (by dependent origination)". From MN 38 , SN 22.85 , SN 12.20 and other suttas, and from "*sabbe dhamma anatta*" (all phenomena is not self - Dhp 279 ), we have learned that there is no specific individual self that is permanent, unchanging and continues to wander within this or other lives. The endeavouring being (self) (AN 6.38 ) is ever-changing and arises from dependently originated conditions. So, where does the "old karma" which generated our physical body and our mind come from? Does it come from our parents, family, community, media, books, surroundings? Are there any scriptural references or commentaries to support this?

It's been asserted by some knowledgeable individuals that the Buddha explicitly identified "the mental idea of the self" as what is (re)born in samsara and has done so in suttas spelling out the doctrine of dependent origination. Is it true that the Buddha *explicitly* identified "the mental idea of the self" as what is (re)born in samsara? If not, is it true that the Buddha *implicitly intended* to identify "the mental idea of the self" as what is (re)born in samsara? Please provide sutta references. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka we say it is the "mere I" that is reborn and not the "mental idea of the self" and we say *how* it is reborn is through the doctrine of dependent origination which *involves* the mental idea of the self. I think this is a significant difference.

In line with my understanding of the teachings, I have been letting go of many possessions that have been accumulating in my life. I realized they really are unnecessary, they mostly just add stress to my life, and I can possibly use them to do good for myself and others by turning them into gifts/dana. I decided to clear out my parents garage of most of the things they are storing from my childhood. Initially, I quickly came up with the plan to sell all the valuables donating their proceeds to the Sangha, and donate anything else to Goodwill or a similar non-profit thrift store. However, as I thought about it, I began to consider the Buddha's teachings about right livelihood and the five trades he specifically discouraged as well as his teachings to the actor, Talaputa. My understanding of this teaching regarding livelihood is that the Buddha discourages participating in trade where you will be harmed or encourage others to be harmed through the breaking of the precepts, or in arousing passions, aversion or delusion. As I thought about this, I have started wondering: is it right to sell my old valuables, or even give away possessions that may cause this kind of harm to their recipients? Would it be better to just throw these things away? I would like to keep the question general, as perhaps others will have this same dilemma but have different possessions; but in my case, there are a few notable examples that have me perplexed, including: Things that could be classified as weapons like fishing poles, fishing tackle. Fishing/camping/bushcraft knives. Things that have fed my passion for sensuality (and still do even as I have firmly decided to part with them). Like my trading card game collections of Magic the Gathering and Pokemon. And my collection of retro video games. Even things like kids toys, stuffed animals, action figures, nerf guns all seem like they will excite passion, aversion and delusion in their ultimate recipients. So I am having this dilemma, because some of the things are valuable and could become support for the Sangha through the donation of the proceeds. But, the vast majority of the items are now questionable to me as to whether they cause harm. Does anyone have any suggestions as to how to part with these possessions skillfully?

I have heard a lot about "Indra's Net". A wiki says that it describes how emptiness and dependent origination are creating the universe. Can anyone provide me a link and book which I should read, to understand this more?

After some reflection, I've noticed many of my mental hangups / dispositions (sankhara) were formed due to a deep seated fear of losing control over my mind / volition. Examples that come to mind include: - Being deceived into doing something against my principles - Being coerced into doing something unethical - Performing negative actions caused by a mental illness (Alzheimer, ...) - Having my ideas changed through to physical torture How can I overcome this fear? ---------- My understanding of the Dharma is limited, so I would appreciate help understanding the situation from that perspective. Is this fear caused by attachment to mental dispositions? Is this a fetter? In particular, is it caused or conditioned by belief in self? Are dispositions part of self? I understand that theoretically mental dispositions should be impermanent? But in practice some dispositions are very hard or impossible to change. Does it make sense to focus on changing unhelpful dispositions? Would it make more sense to keep analysing the causal link of the dispositions, practising more meditation to notice the fear when it arises, or practising acceptance of the current situation?

According to Lama Surya Das, novice monks traditionally meditate 23 hours a day, with one hour for sleep. I met another American lama who said the same thing. How is this even possible? Even if the monk goes into deep meditation, is one hour of sleep enough? And these were novices. I have wondered about this for years, and can't seem to find anything about it on the web. I often meditate when tired, because of chronic insomnia, and I often wonder what the relationship between sleep and meditation is. Does anyone know anything about this practice? Sorry if this is not specific enough, but I don't know anything else about this practice, but I find it extremely intriguing.

I've noticed it's really difficult for me to be consistent, even with short meditation. I'm thus hesitating between: - 10 min sessions every day - 40 min sessions every 2 or 3 days Which of these seems more beneficial?

In most Buddhist traditions, monks are expected to follow an austere life without being married or involved with another person, but what about lay people who are not going to become monks? Personally, I've reached what most people consider mid-life and I'm getting too old for any monastery to accept me, but I'm sure this question applies to lay people both older and younger. I am under the impression, monks are required to be single because of the attachment and desire that arises when being involved. However, a good number of monks do not live among lay people which I imagine would make it easier. It seems like lay people would benefit though, and when their time on Earth has expired also make it easier to let go. However, I don't have a teacher nor do I have access to one so I wanted to reach out to the community to see what their impressions were. My guess is that it is helpful but a personal choice that differs from individual to individual. I mean 'helpful' in the sense of being closer to Nirvana or Enlightenment.

I ask this question as someone on Twitter was arguing that Buddhism is casteist. He claimed that only upper castes were permitted to enter monkhood. I told him this was completely false and shared the example of Upali the barber. He shared the following link: [Buddhism: An Atheistic and Anti-Caste Religion?](https://t.co/3V1fy9fwKP?amp=1) by Edmund Weber. >The standpoint which caste a Buddha should belong to has not been revised in Buddhism up to the present day. It is dogmatised in the Lalitavistara in the following way: a Bodhisattva can by no means come from a lower or even mixed caste: > >>“After all Bodhisattvas were not born in despised lineage, among pariahs, in families of pipe or cart makers, or mixed castes.” > >Instead, in perfect harmony with the Great Sermon, it was said that: > >>“The Bodhisattvas appear only in two kinds of lineage, the one of the brahmanas and of the warriors (kshatriya).” I corrected him that the document referred to Bodhisattvas and not ordinary monks who could grow to become full Arahants. He claimed that the religion was still casteist as only Brahmin and Kshatriyas could become Bodhisattvas. What does the Pali cannon say regarding this? Can you share any studies done on this by scholars?

Please limit the benefits to the here and now, because an ingenious youth hearing the benefit of future rebirths and also hearing hard to grasp concepts of karma might surely say “what’s in it for me *now*? what do I care what happens in the future?”. In other words, one who is a beginner and who lack virtues will say “Ooh this karmic concept you teach is like borrowing money from someone I don't know and I don't have to pay right *now* so why should I care?” By saying the above I’m not trying to open a discussion about Karma / Self etc… a virtue done because of idea of self as proposed by other religions where you get tormented in the future for action done here is a phony virtue, its like being temperate toward your wife for fear of losing her.

In Mahayana Buddhism, is it the true self that is reborn, or is it the empirical self? I tend to see it described as if it's just the latter, but then if I am my true self, then doesn't that equate to annihilationism and nihilism?

For at least half of my life I've had an extremely strong desire to be in a relationship/have a girlfriend and though I've tried, I've been unsuccessful and this has brought me tremendous suffering to the point where I almost committed suicide 2 years ago. I see couples in a similar age group as me every single day and this further increases my suffering. I first encountered Buddhism 2 years ago and through its teachings I've detached myself from the past and have removed my strong desire for material wealth and this indeed has removed a lot of suffering from my life, however, I just can't seem to let go of immense desire to have a girlfriend even after realizing that external circumstances never bring lasting happiness and fulfillment. How can I let go of this destructive desire?

I have been continuing my meditation practice, and I feel there would be a great benefit from switching to a metta practice instead of breath. Yet, with metta, a strange phenomenon occurs. I am usually very good *during* metta bhavana and generate the feelings. However, it is incredibly hard for me to begin the metta session, and I seem to avoid this type of meditation before and afterwards. Only during the practice do I feel great emotion and compassion. How can this be explained? Thank you.