Do beings without conscious experiences have buddha nature

A philosophical zombie is defined as follows, > Zombies **in philosophy** are imaginary creatures used to **illuminate problems about consciousness** and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but **without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie**. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness. > > Few people think zombies actually exist. But many hold they are at least conceivable, and some that they are possible. It is argued that if zombies are so much as a bare possibility, then physicalism is false and some kind of dualism is true. For many philosophers that is the chief importance of the zombie idea. But **the idea is also of interest for its presuppositions about the nature of consciousness and how the physical and the phenomenal are related**. Use of the zombie idea against physicalism also raises more general questions about relations between imaginability, conceivability, and possibility. Finally, zombies raise epistemological difficulties: they reinstate the ‘other minds’ problem. Using this definition, would a being which is "not conscious" have Buddha-nature? I ask because I want to know if the Buddha is dead and inanimate matter, and inanimate matter has Buddha nature, that means that the Buddha senses what inanimate matter does? Moreover, I want to know if a non cognition of emptiness is "like " a cognition.