Cessation of suffering is the main goal of Buddhism, but is cessation of suffering the end goal or does Buddhism pursue Joy beyond end of suffering?

I ask the above because Socrates in the Republic has proven that the cessation of suffering is a quietude of the mind, an illusion or a jugglery not real. What we should we aim according to him is not the end of suffering which is a quietude, but true Joy. Quoted below is form the Republic ... *( i have added [mind] next to Soul to ease the reading for those who detest the idea of the soul; i think, the soul in Socratic tradition is akin to mind in Buddist ideas, but that in itself is a long discussion ..)* ---------- > Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain? > > True. And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor > pain? > > There is. > > A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the [mind] soul about > either --that is what you mean? > > Yes. > > You remember what people say when they are sick? > > What do they say? > > That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never > knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill. > > Yes, I know, he said. > > And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must. have heard > them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their > pain? > > I have. > > And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and > cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them > as the greatest pleasure? > > Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at > rest. > > Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be > painful? > > Doubtless, he said. > > Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be > pain? > > So it would seem. > > But can that which is neither become both? > > I should say not. > > And both pleasure and pain are motions of the [mind] soul, are they not? > Yes. > > But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not > motion, and in a mean between them? > > Yes. > > How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is > pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain? > > Impossible. > > This then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the > rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, > and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these > representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real > but a sort of imposition? > > That is the inference. > > Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains > and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that > pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure. > > What are they, he said, and where shall I find them? There are many > of them: take as an example the pleasures, of smell, which are very > great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and when > they depart leave no pain behind them. > > Most true, he said. > > Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the > cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure. > > No. > > Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the [mind] soul > through the body are generally of this sort --they are reliefs of > pain. > > That is true. > > And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like > nature? > > Yes. > > Shall I give you an illustration of them? > > Let me hear. > > You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower > and middle region? > > I should. > > And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would > he not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the > middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already > in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world? > > To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise? > > But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, > that he was descending? > > No doubt. > > All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle > and lower regions? > > Yes. > > Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, > as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have > wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so > that when they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain > and think the pain which they experience to be real, and in like > manner, when drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate > state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety > and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with > the absence of pain. which is like contrasting black with grey instead > of white --can you wonder, I say, at this? > >No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite. >....