How should the “self-luminous beings” in the Aggañña Sutta be understood in light of anattā and early Buddhist phenomenology?

In DN 27 , the Buddha describes beings at the beginning of a world-cycle as:- > There comes a time when, after a very long period has passed, this > cosmos expands. As the cosmos expands, sentient beings mostly pass > away from that host of radiant deities and come back to this > realm.**Here they are mind-made, feeding on rapture, self-luminous**, > wandering in midair, steadily glorious, and they remain like that for > a very long time. These beings (often associated with the Ābhassara Brahmā realm) are said to precede differentiation into gross materiality, sexual distinction, and even external light sources such as the sun and moon, which only become apparent after their luminosity fades In standard early Buddhist analysis, individuation is typically explained in terms of distinct streams of aggregates conditioned by ignorance and craving. However, in this primordial phase, the narrative appears to precede the emergence of precisely those differentiating conditions tied to coarse embodiment and structured sensory fields. This seems to raise a problem about how plurality is being conceived in this passage. One possibility is that individuation is grounded in distinct streams of consciousness, even in the absence of coarse material support. But if that is the case, it is not immediately clear how this fits with standard formulations of dependent origination, where consciousness and name-and-form are mutually conditioning, and where the six sense bases play a central role in structuring experience. If the relevant differentiating structures have not yet arisen, in what sense can there already be numerically distinct continua? Another possibility is that “self-luminosity” (sayaṃ-pabhā) implies some form of self-manifestation that could ground individuation internally rather than externally. But this raises a further difficulty. If each being is self-manifesting in a way that secures its distinctness, doesn't this risk introducing a subtle form of intrinsic identity that would be difficult to reconcile with anattā?