How do different Buddhist traditions avoid the charge of epistemological nihilism while still affirming emptiness (sunyata)?

In Madhyamaka and other Buddhist schools, emptiness (śūnyatā) is a central doctrine: all phenomena are said to lack inherent existence. But at the same time, many Buddhist traditions place significant emphasis on knowledge and valid cognition (pramāṇa), as developed in the epistemological works of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers. This raises an important philosophical issue: if all phenomena including concepts, perceptions, and inferences too are ultimately empty, Would this not imply epistemological nihilism , where no knowledge of any sort of 'absolute truth' is possible? Are there specific texts or commentaries where Buddhist philosophers explicitly address the concern that asserting emptiness might undermine knowledge itself? I’m looking for explanations that clarify how Buddhism maintains a coherent epistemology without contradicting its central teaching of emptiness.