Is the self an illusion or is it *like* an illusion?

Recently, in explaining the relative unimportance of the question whether phenomena lack true existence it was claimed that, "the self is definitely an illusion" and lacked true existence. This seemed to be held up as an *important fact* that has significance in the pragmatic soteriological aims of Theravada in contrast to the above mentioned question. A few questions that arise: * First, is the self an illusion or not? Here it was said by the same person above that the self was not an illusion? * If either the self is like an illusion or is literally an illusion, is this synonymous with saying that it lacks true or real existence from the Theravada viewpoint? * Why does Theravada regard this question about the ontological status of the self of persons to be an important question? Why can't we just say that the self of persons is real and true like other phenomena, but transient or lacking sara as Chris said was the correct interpretation of SN 22.95 * Why does Theravada regard the question of whether the aggregates have intrinsic value, worth, meaning and lasting quality an important question? If the self does not truly exist like an illusion, then what does it matter if the aggregates have intrinsic value, worth, meaning and lasting quality since the self cannot be found in them? Some Theravada adherents say that, "the original Pali sutta's" do away with unnecessary speculation or "ontological hamster wheels." :) However, paradoxically it seems some Theravada regard the question of the ontological status of the self to be very important. It's also clear that Sariputra thought it very important to correct Yamaka about this. And the Buddha himself thought it important to instruct how the aggregates and other phenomena were to be regarded as lacking intrinsic value, worth, meaning and lasting quality irregardless questions of the self.